Opportunities of Trade in Services between the EU and Ukraine: the Case of Telecommunications Services under the GATS and the Association Agreement by Batura, Olga & Kretova, Olga
www.ssoar.info
Opportunities of Trade in Services between the
EU and Ukraine: the Case of Telecommunications
Services under the GATS and the Association
Agreement
Batura, Olga; Kretova, Olga
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Batura, O., & Kretova, O. (2015). Opportunities of Trade in Services between the EU and Ukraine: the Case of
Telecommunications Services under the GATS and the Association Agreement. (ZERP-Arbeitspapier, 1). Bremen:
Zentrum für Europäische Rechtspolitik (ZERP) an der Universität Bremen. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-62312-4
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
ZENTRUM FÜR EUROPÄISCHE RECHTSPOLITIK 
CENTRE OF EUROPEAN LAW AND POLITICS 
 
University Bremen 
ZERP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Olga Batura / Olga Kretova 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opportunities of Trade in Services between 
the EU and Ukraine:  
the Case of Telecommunications Services  
under the GATS and the Association  
Agreement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ZERP-Working Paper 1/2015 
 Abstract 
This working paper studies the legal and regulatory conditions for trade in ser-
vices between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine on the example of tele-
communications services that are important carrier services for various busi-
ness activities in the cross-border trade. The paper outlines the general frame-
work for trade in services under the GATS as expressed in the commitments 
undertaken by Ukraine and examines the detailed provisions of the EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement on trade liberalisation and regulatory approx-
imation that is a WTO-extra agreement. It also provides an overview of the 
relevant Ukrainian legal and regulatory rules in order to assess the starting 
point for regulatory approximation. The paper intends to highlight internal 
contradictions of the Association Agreement representing a balancing act be-
tween the liberalisation obligations under the WTO agreements and require-
ments of integration in the EU internal market. The paper argues that in short 
to middle term the Association Agreement does not offer much of value-added 
in comparison to the current GATS commitments in terms of services liberali-
sation. The juiciest “carrot” of the Association Agreement – the internal mar-
ket treatment – is difficult to reach due to unclear and complicated rules on 
regulatory approximation.  
Key words: EU, Ukraine, trade in services, telecommunications services, liber-
alisation, regulatory approximation 
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1. Introduction 
This paper studies the legal and regulatory conditions for trade in services be-
tween the European Union (EU) and Ukraine focusing on the example of the 
telecommunications sector. The EU has been the largest Ukrainian trade part-
ner in various services sectors for many years: the EU is the second favourite 
destination of the Ukrainian services exports (after the CIS), and it is the larg-
est source of services imports (currently over 50%).1 The focus on the tele-
communications sector is chosen, firstly, because telecommunications services 
are a valuable asset per se2 and, secondly, because they are carrier services in-
dispensable for the tradability of other services (banking, professional and 
business services, educational services, computer services, audio-visual ser-
vices and others) and some goods (electronic commerce) and, thus, contrib-
uting directly to international trade in services and goods in general. Consider-
ing the accession of Ukraine to the WTO in May 2008 and the newly signed 
Association Agreement with the EU, it is deemed necessary to study how these 
events change the legal framework for trade and to develop a potential to en-
hance trade relations between the Parties by reducing regulatory barriers. 
The study starts with a brief overview of selected issues of the general legal 
framework for trade in services set out by the GATS relevant for the topic of 
this investigation. Since both the EU and Ukraine are Members to the WTO,3 
from the point of view of the GATS the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement is 
a preferential trade agreement (PTA) that has to satisfy the conditions of Arti-
cle V GATS. Therefore, in the second step, this study looks more specifically 
at the commitments of the EU and Ukraine, undertaken multilaterally, in order 
to prepare a background, against which the bilateral trade relations can be ana-
                                                 
1  See “Ukraine increases export of services in the EU”. Information-Analytical Bulle-
tin of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 14 February 2014. Available 
<http://en.info-kmu.com.ua/2014-02-17-000000pm/article/6074391.html> (accessed 
31.01.2015); “EU-27 Surplus of 9 bn Euro in Trade in Goods with Ukraine in 2012.” 
Eurostat News release 27/2013, 22 February 2013. 
2  The Ukrainian source indicates the increase of 28% in trade with telecommunica-
tions, computer and information services. See “Ukraine increases export of services 
in the EU”. Information-Analytical Bulletin of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 
14 February 2014; The EU is the leading exporter and importer of communications 
services worldwide by far. See WTO, International Trade Statistics 2013, pp. 159-
161. Available <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2013_e/its2013_e.pdf> 
(accessed 31.01.2015). 
3  The EU (European Communities and its Member States) became a founding member 
of the WTO in 1994. Ukraine joined the WTO in 2008, after almost 15 years of ne-
gotiations. 
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lysed. Next, the study turns to an examination of the parts of the Association 
Agreement relevant for trade in services, namely liberalisation commitments, 
rules on domestic regulation and questions of regulatory approximation. 
Against this backdrop, in the last substantive part, the study presents a snap-
shot of the Ukrainian legal and regulatory framework on the telecommunica-
tions sector. The main findings of the investigation with regard to the altera-
tions of the legal conditions and perspectives for trade in services will be pre-
sented in the conclusion. 
2. The WTO framework for trade in services:  
Ukraine’s and EU’s concessions under the GATS 
2.1 GATS regime for trade in services: a brief and incomplete  
overview 
The GATS constitutes the first multilateral agreement comprehensively ad-
dressing the international trade in services and covers all services sectors with 
exception of services supplied in exercise of governmental authority (Article 
I.3 (b) and (c) GATS).4 Due to the specifics of the subject-matter, the GATS is 
designed to address in the first line regulatory obstacles to trade and obstacles 
resulting from regulatory diversity.5 By contrast to goods, services are intangi-
ble and perishable, characterised by simultaneous production and consump-
tion6 – and, hence, also by a certain proximity of the service provider and con-
sumer. As a result, most of the trade in services occurs within national borders, 
and an “international” provision requires factor mobility that presents a chal-
lenge from the point of view of political economy.7 Even where a service 
“crosses” a border, when provided by means of (tele)communications, it is dif-
                                                 
4  For the notion of “services supplied in exercise of governmental authority” see Kra-
jewski, Markus, Public Services and Trade Liberalization: Mapping the Legal 
Framework, in: Journal of International Economic Law 6:2, 2003, pp. 341-367; Ad-
lung, Rudolf, Public Service and the GATS, Working Paper ERSD-2005-3, 2005. 
5  Matsushita, Mitsuo, Thomas Schoenbaum and Petros Mavroidis, The World Trade 
Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy. 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006, pp. 604-605. 
6  Sáez, Sebastián, The Strategic Development Role of Trade in Services, in: Sáez, 
Sebastián (ed.), Trade in Services Negotiations: A Guide for Developing Countries. 
World Bank, 2010, p. 1. 
7  Copeland, Brian and Aaditya Mattoo, The Basic Economics of Services Trade, in: 
Mattoo, Aaditya, Robert Stern and Gianni Zanini (eds.), A Handbook of Internation-
al Trade in Services, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 84. 
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ficult to apply border measures, like tariffs, to it.8 In these circumstances, re-
strictive implications emanate from divergent or even protectionist domestic 
rules regarding the conditions of access to the market for services providers 
(for instance, licensing, certificates, standards) and the modalities of services 
provision (for example, local content, price-based restrictions).  
Due to specific characteristics of services mentioned above, trade in ser-
vices is understood by the GATS as supply of services that can occur in one of 
the following four modes (Article I.2 GATS): 
1. cross-border supply where both supplier and recipient stay in their re-
spective States and only a service passes the frontier by means of 
(tele)communications (Mode 1); 
2. consumption abroad where a consumer crosses the border to receive a 
service (Mode 2); 
3. commercial presence where a supplier from one state establishes a repre-
sentation, a branch or other type of commercial presence in another state for 
purposes of services provision (Mode 3); 
4. presence of natural persons where a service supplier from one state is on-
ly temporary established in the territory of another state by way of posting its 
workers or being present otherwise as a natural person (self-employed) (Mode 
4). 
Due to particularities of trade in services, its liberalisation takes the form of 
“restricting domestic regulation”.9 For a particular state liberalisation of trade 
in service means to allow participation of the private sector in services provi-
sion, to allow foreign providers to compete with domestic providers, including 
state-owned undertakings, on a non-discriminatory basis and to eliminate other 
restrictions that encourage inefficient services provision (for instance, subsi-
dies).10 
In the GATS framework these considerations are addressed through two 
types of obligations. First, there are general obligations that are applicable to 
all services sectors of any GATS Member (Part II GATS). General obligations 
are of great importance for the world trade in services as they provide for legal 
                                                 
8  Hoekman, Bernard and Carlos Primo Braga, Protection and Trade in Service: A Sur-
vey, The World Bank Policy Research Paper, April 1997, p. 5. 
9  Matsushita, Mitsuo, Thomas Schoenbaum and Petros Mavroidis, The World Trade 
Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy. 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006, p. 604. 
10  Sáez, Sebastián, The Strategic Development Role of Trade in Services, in: Sáez, 
Sebastián (ed.), Trade in Services Negotiations: A Guide for Developing Countries. 
World Bank, 2010, p. 7. 
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certainty for economic actors about the minimum rules in a foreign country. 
The most important of them are:  
 most favoured nation (MFN) treatment (Article II GATS), 
 transparency (Article III GATS), 
 domestic regulation (Article VI GATS), 
 competition-related requirement (Articles VIII and IX GATS), 
 progressive liberalisation via continuous negotiations. 
MFN treatment basically prohibits a GATS Member to discriminate between 
like services and like service providers from different countries because it 
mandates to treat all foreign service providers in the same way as it treats those 
from its most favoured trade partner. The MFN treatment shall be granted au-
tomatically and unconditionally11, and exemptions to it have a limited charac-
ter, based on the so called negative list approach, and could be taken only dur-
ing the Uruguay negotiations round. Currently, deviations from the MFN 
treatment are possible only on the basis of the waiver provisions (Article IX.3 
WTO Agreement).12 
The transparency provision requires that relevant regulations of a GATS 
Member shall be clear and readily accessible to foreign service providers 
through publications, inquiry points and periodical notification of the Council 
on Trade in Services of all relevant new rules. 
Requirements to domestic regulation set out in the GATS are of procedural 
and substantive nature. The procedural obligation requests GATS Members to 
administer measures affecting trade in services in a reasonable, objective and 
impartial manner and to establish adjudicating bodies for disputes concerning 
trade in services that function in a timely, impartial and objective manner. On 
the substantive level, GATS Members are to ensure that qualification require-
ments and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not 
constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services.  
Of particular importance for many services sectors are competition-related 
requirements aimed at keeping the behaviour of monopolistic and exclusive 
services providers in check in order not to compromise liberalisation commit-
ments made by a GATS Member. The same applies to restrictive business 
                                                 
11  For interpretation of the term see Matsushita, Mitsuo, Thomas Schoenbaum and 
Petros Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy. 2nd 
edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 621-622. 
12  Matsushita, Mitsuo, Thomas Schoenbaum and Petros Mavroidis, The World Trade 
Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy. 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006, p. 623. 
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practices of market operators. 
The second type of GATS obligations – sector-specific obligations – are re-
ciprocal commitments on liberalisation of specific services sectors. Sector-
specific obligations are applicable only to the services, explicitly listed in the 
schedule of commitments of each Member (so called positive list approach), 
and only to the extent indicated in the schedule of commitments (Part III 
GATS). The most important specific obligations are market access (Article 
XVI GATS) and national treatment (Article XVII GATS). 
The content of market access commitments is not defined in general, but is 
determined in country schedules for each and every service or services sector. 
The GATS only requires its Members to ensure that market access actually 
granted to foreign services suppliers corresponds to the respective legal obliga-
tions of such Member. Therefore, Article XVI GATS does not set a non-
discrimination standard, but requires that all limitations to market access, both 
discriminatory and not, are stated in schedules of communications.13 
By contrast, the national treatment obligation, if accepted by a GATS 
Member, does constitute a non-discrimination requirement: it does not allow 
discriminating between foreign and domestic like services and service suppli-
ers. At the same time, the standard of treatment required is not equality, but no 
less favourable treatment what, even though unlikely, may lead to positive dis-
crimination of foreigners.  
Even though it is almost impossible to address liberalisation and limitations 
remained in every single services sector in detail due to the fact that domestic 
rules are very greatly depending on the type of services,14 a couple of general 
words can be said about the liberalisation profile of the EU and Ukraine as ex-
pressed in their schedules of commitments.  
An assessment of the EU’s commitments in liberalising trade in services is 
a difficult project. The EU’s specific commitments are complicated as they 
consist of schedules of specific commitments of all its Member States.15 This 
makes a concise and relatively comprehensive overview impossible. However, 
                                                 
13  Krajewski, Markus, National Regulation and Trade Liberalization in Services: The 
Legal Impact of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National 
Regulatory Autonomy, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003, p. 82. 
14  Deardorff, Alan and Robert Stern, Empirical Analysis of Barriers to International 
Services Transactions and the Consequences of Liberalization, in: Mattoo, Aaditya, 
Robert Stern and Gianni Zanini eds.), A Handbook of International Trade in Ser-
vices, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 178. 
15  See, for instance, a Draft consolidated GATS schedule of 2006 submitted for certifi-
cation to the Council for Trade in Services, Communication from the European 
Communities and its Member States, S/C/W273 of 09.10.2006. 
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some general observations can be made in order to outline the main features 
and the spirit of the undergone commitments. Openness to global trade is a 
critical requirement for growth and competitiveness of the EU’s economy and 
allows exploiting benefits of the internal market in full.16 Therefore, opening 
the markets, especially by reducing non-tariff barriers, in “cornerstone” sectors 
of the European economy, like services, is high on the EU’s agenda.17  
The EU’s commitments cover 115 services subsectors of 155 that were on 
the negotiations table during the Uruguay round.18 Eschenbach and Hoekman 
found the EU-15 level of specific commitments on market access and national 
treatment to be higher than that of other developed WTO Members.19 A study 
by Langhammer confirmed this finding for the EU’s offer filed in the Doha 
negotiation round: the offer significantly increases the overall commitment 
level, in particular in Modes 2 and 3.20 Few limitations on services provision in 
Modes 2 and 3 remain in place, maintained by a minority of EU Member 
States. The only limitations in place for the whole EU are the following: With 
regard to market access, in public utilities sectors monopoly and/or exclusive 
rights can be maintained. With regard to national treatment, freedom of estab-
lishment applicable to subsidiaries from other EU Member States does not ex-
tend to subsidiaries from third countries. Mode 4 is unbound both with regard 
to market access and national treatment, and very few horizontal concessions 
(locking in the status quo) are made to allow intra-corporate transfer, presence 
of business visitors and contractual service suppliers. The restrictions main-
tained by individual EU Member States vary so greatly depending on a service 
and mode of provision that any attempt to classify them is likely to be incom-
plete.21  
                                                 
16  See one of the most recent statements in Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Commit-
tee and the Committee of the Regions, Global Europe: Competing in the World. A 
Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy, COM(2006) 567 final, p. 4. 
17  Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
18  Hoekman, Bernard, Aaditya Mattoo and André Sapir, The Political Economy of 
Services Trade Liberalization: A Case for International Regulatory Cooperation? in: 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 23:3, 2007, p. 374. 
19  Eschenbach, Felix and Bernard Hoekman, Services Policy Reform and Economic 
Growth in Transition Economies, 1990–2004, in: Review of World Economics 
142:4, 2006, pp. 746-764. 
20  Langhammer, Rolf, The EU offer of service trade liberalization in the Doha Round: 
evidence of a not-yet-perfect customs union, in: Journal of common market studies 
43:2, 2005, pp. 311-325. 
21  However, see a short classification in Langhammer, Rolf, The EU offer of service 
trade liberalization in the Doha Round: evidence of a not-yet-perfect customs union, 
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Ukraine’s specific commitments in services22 can be considered quite far-
reaching as they cover subsectors in all eleven services sectors under negotia-
tions in the Uruguay round, with only few limitations in market access and na-
tional treatment. The most notable (horizontal) limitation preserved concerns 
Mode 4: Ukraine remains unbound (undertook no commitments) with regard 
to market access and national treatment in all services sectors. It declared, 
however, its horizontal restrictions for Mode 4 that are applicable to all sched-
ules services sectors. In this way, it has locked internationally its regulatory 
regime for economic migrants with the effect that it will not be able to change 
it easily and this level of commitments will be a departure point for further lib-
eralisation negotiations. For foreign individuals who are executives, managers 
and specialists transferred within a corporation23 a work permit is issued for a 
period of 3 years and may be extended for further 2 years. Other foreign indi-
viduals, namely services sellers and persons responsible for the establishment 
of commercial presence in Ukraine, can enter and stay in Ukraine up to 180 
days per one calendar year without a work permit. Ukraine did not reserve a 
transition period for any of the services sectors, although usually countries 
with economy in transition and developing countries negotiate an adjustment 
period for themselves. 
2.2 Commitments in telecommunications services sector 
In the telecommunications sector, both the EU and Ukraine undertook com-
mitments in all the services on the Services Sectoral Classification List, aka 
W120 list24, used as a common basis to describe services in negotiations. Dif-
ferently from many developing countries and countries with transition econo-
my, Ukraine committed itself to liberalise both the so called basic and value-
added telecommunications. 
According to paragraph 1 of the Decision on Negotiations on Basic Tele-
communications “basic telecommunications” are defined as “telecommunica-
tions transport of networks and services”.25 Under the W120 list, basic tele-
communications include the sub-sectors from (a) to (g): voice telephone ser-
vices, packet-switched data transmission services, circuit-switched data trans-
                                                                                                                                                     
in: Journal of common market studies 43:2, 2005, pp. 13-15. 
22  Ukraine’s Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/144 of 10 March 2008. 
23  See Ukrainian schedule of specific commitments for definition of the terms “execu-
tive”, “manager” and other. 
24  MNG/GNS/W/120 of 10 July 1991. 
25  Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications Services of 15 April 1994. 
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mission services, telex services, telegraph services, facsimile services, private 
leased circuit services. Due to the fact that the W120 list is an open one, under 
the category (o) (“other”) Ukraine listed additional services as basic telecom-
munications: mobile voice and data services, paging services, teleconferencing 
services, integrated telecommunication services, excluding broadcasting.  
The services from (h) till (n) of the W120 list are considered value-added 
telecommunications meaning that they enhance the mere transportation of the 
electro-magnetic signal by processing, storing, forwarding or other operations 
with the signal without, however, changing the content of the transmitted mes-
sage. However, there is no legal or other definition of value-added telecommu-
nications in the GATS documents or in the Ukrainian schedule. In the Ukraini-
an schedule value-added services include electronic mail, voice mail, on-line 
information and data base retrieval, electronic data interchange, value-added 
facsimile services, including store and forward, store and retrieve, code and 
protocol conversion and on-line information services and/or data processing 
(including transaction processing).  
The EU’s schedule does not list separate services and/or subsectors falling 
under basic and value-added telecommunications. In fact, it uses a different 
definition of telecommunications services altogether that is in line with its in-
ternal term “electronic communications”. Accordingly, telecommunications 
are all services consisting of the transmission and reception of signals by any 
electromagnetic means, excluding broadcasting. Telecommunications do not 
cover the economic activity of content provision which require telecommuni-
cations services for their transport. The relevant services of the W120 list are 
covered only in so far as they fall under this description. Herewith, the cover-
age of EU’s specific commitments goes beyond the respective parts of the 
W120 list, but is not clearly identifiable. 
In all the named types of telecommunications services, Ukraine made no 
limitations in the modes of services provision 1 to 3 (cross-border supply, con-
sumption abroad and foreign commercial presence) either for market access or 
for national treatment. Only presence of natural persons (mode 4) remains un-
bound in both regards:26 no sector specific liberalisation is intended in this re-
gard, yet horizontal commitments and limitations are applicable. From the per-
spective of the telecommunications industry, the limitations of mode 4 cannot 
be considered significant because the nature of telecommunications service is 
such that it does not require a personal (human) presence, but rather a com-
mercial presence.  
Therefore, a prohibition for foreign and stateless natural persons to acquire 
                                                 
26  This is the case for all services sectors.  
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into property agricultural lands, to privatise or to acquire free of charge land 
plots belonging to the State is of no relevance for the telecommunications sec-
tor. On the other hand, it is important that there are no restrictions on national 
treatment for foreign legal persons acquiring non-agricultural lands into prop-
erty – what is more relevant for telecommunications business. Also, potentially 
relevant is the rule that access to subsidies and other forms of State support is 
limited to Ukrainian citizens and legal persons. National treatment in this re-
gard does not apply to foreigners. 
Commitments undertaken by the EU are very similar. Mode 4 remains un-
bound, while no limitations are maintained by the absolute majority of EU 
Member States in Modes 1-3. The lonely exceptions are Cyprus and Malta that 
have chosen to stay unbound in Mode 1 with regard to market access and na-
tional treatment; Finland that imposes conditions of residence on founders and 
board members; and France, Poland and Slovenia that maintain limitations on 
foreign participation in companies. 
2.3 Additional commitments on regulatory principles 
The EU and Ukraine undertook a set of additional commitments known as the 
Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles (Reference Paper). For Ukraine, these 
additional commitments apply to the basic telecommunications services listed in 
its schedule. The EU made a separate list of services to which the Reference Pa-
per applies. This list largely corresponds to the Ukrainian list of basic telecom-
munications with the only difference that the category (o) “other” specifies sole-
ly mobile and personal communications services and systems. 
As the title suggests, under the Reference Paper Parties have committed 
themselves to design their domestic regulatory frameworks for basic telecom-
munications according to certain principles. The Reference Paper addresses the 
most critical issues of the telecommunications services sector and market in or-
der to ensure effective opening up of national markets to foreign providers. For 
this, the Reference Paper requires the signatories to introduce several competi-
tion law elements, guarantees of interconnection, procedural requirements of 
transparency and to provide for independence of the sectoral regulatory body. 
Although Parties may modify additional commitments of the Reference Paper, 
both the EU and Ukraine signed this document in identical wording. 
According to Section 1 of the Reference Paper, a Party is to adopt competi-
tive safeguards in order to prevent anti-competitive practices by a major suppli-
er. This is to guarantee that the incumbent does not abuse its position and market 
strength to prevent or deter new market entries and to disturb the activities of 
competitors. Among the examples of anti-competitive practices the Reference 
 12
Paper names anti-competitive cross-subsidisation, using information from com-
petitors with anti-competitive results and not providing competitors with tech-
nical information about essential facilities and with commercial information 
necessary for them to provide services. A position of a major supplier can be 
hold individually or collectively by suppliers who can materially affect partici-
pation on the relevant market (namely, price and supply) due to control over es-
sential facilities or due to use of its position in the market. Essential facilities are 
defined by the Reference Paper as facilities of a public telecommunications 
transport network or service that are exclusively or predominantly provided by a 
single or limited number of suppliers and that cannot feasibly be economically 
or technically substituted in order to provide a service. 
Interconnection with domestic telecommunications providers is of central 
importance for foreign market participants willing to reach customers directly 
and compete on the domestic market. Especially in the market for fixed tele-
communications, construction of wired or cable telecommunications networks 
may be economically not feasible (duplication) or even physically not possible. 
That is why a large part of the Reference Paper addresses establishment of in-
terconnection defined as linking with suppliers providing public telecommuni-
cations transport networks or services in order to allow the users of one suppli-
er to communicate with users of another supplier and to access services pro-
vided by another supplier (Section 2.1).  
The focus of the provisions of Section 2 of the Reference Paper is on ensur-
ing interconnection with a major supplier. This is a logical approach as the in-
cumbent, who would fall under the definition of a major supplier, usually owns 
the biggest or maybe even the only public telecommunications network, and 
inability to interconnect with its network would make it impossible to provide 
services and to compete in the host market. Therefore, interconnection with a 
major supplier needs to be ensured at any technically feasible point of the net-
work. Additionally, such interconnection is subject to several conditions that 
are aimed at preventing discrimination between services of a major supplier 
and other domestic services, on the one hand, and the services of a foreign 
provider, on the other, and that anticipate other deterring tactics by a major 
provider (Section 2.2). Procedures for interconnection negotiations with a ma-
jor supplier shall be made publicly available as shall be its interconnection 
agreements or a reference interconnection offer (Section 2.3 and 2.4). Disputes 
on interconnection matters shall be dealt with in a timely manner by an inde-
pendent body (Section 2.5). 
As a part of a (public) utilities sector, telecommunications are considered 
strategically important for a state and nation (territorial and national cohesion), 
for development of the economy (carrier of other services and a main infra-
structure of the future Information Society) and for the society (freedom of in-
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formation, general necessity to communicate). The tremendous importance of 
this sector together with its network character used to justify the provision of 
telecommunications by only one undertaking, which was usually state-owned 
or at least state-controlled, as well as the imposition of certain public policy 
obligations on the telecommunications provider. Public policy concerns may 
constitute serious barriers to trade by reserving some types of activity exclu-
sively for domestic suppliers or by introducing strict conditions and/or re-
strictions of provision that undermine liberalisation.  
One of the most important public policy measures for the telecommunica-
tions sector is addressed by Section 3 of the Reference Paper – universal ser-
vice. Universal service is a concept of provision of particular telecommunica-
tions services in such a way that they are available and affordable to the whole 
population of a State. The concrete legal and regulatory expression of this idea 
differs from state to state. A Party reserves its right to define universal service 
obligation. In order not to undermine the general liberalisation commitment, 
the universal service obligation needs to be administered in a transparent, non-
discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and not to be more burden-
some than necessary. 
Each Party is free to introduce licensing as long as the principle of transpar-
ency is complied with and licensing criteria, terms and conditions of individual 
licences and decision-making timeframe are publicly available (Section 4). 
Radio spectrum, numbers and rights of way constitute scarce resources for 
telecommunications activities, and mechanisms of their allocation and their use 
may be employed to disturb competition on the market and thus to undermine 
the free trade in telecommunications services. According to Section 6 of the 
Reference Paper, a Party undertakes to carry out its activities in these areas in 
an objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory manner. 
3. Trade in telecommunications services under the  
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 
3.1 General issues of trade in services under the Association  
Agreement  
The Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, even though devel-
oped within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, represents 
a classical mixed agreement of the type concluded between the EU and its 
Member States, on the one side, and a third country, on the other. According to 
Article 217 TFEU, the association agreement is the most advanced type of an 
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agreement the EU may conclude with third countries. This type of agreement 
has been used by the EU in two situations: 
1) in preparation of certain states for the accession to the EU (Turkey, 
Croatia), and 
2) as an alternative to the EU membership (Norway, Lichtenstein). 
The EU sees association and accession as two different processes that may be, 
but not necessarily are connected. Association may be followed by accession, 
but the latter is not automatic and depends on a number of factors, not least on 
the political will of the parties and on the absorption capacity of the EU. The 
EU’s Association Agreement with Ukraine is of the second type as its objec-
tives suggest (Article 1 AA): it foresees gradual rapprochement between the 
Parties, increasing Ukrainian association with EU’s policies and agencies, en-
hancing dialogue and cooperation in a number of areas, including economy 
and trade, and eventually leading to Ukrainian integration into the EU internal 
market – with no accession option just now.  
At the moment the Association Agreement is not in force, but its parts on 
political cooperation (Title II) and on economic cooperation were signed on 21 
March and on 26 June 2014 respectively. On the day of signature, many sepa-
rate provisions that have considerable implications for the trade environment 
entered into force according to the text of the Agreement.  
During the negotiations of the Association Agreement and even before that 
(during the preparation of the ENP), there was much speculation about what 
the EU could offer its partner countries in terms of trade and economic conces-
sions if accession to the EU was off the negotiations table. European foreign 
trade is largely liberalised due to extensive concessions in the WTO. Most 
neighbouring countries benefitted from the EU’s Generalised System of Pref-
erences while the EU sponsored their accession to the WTO,27 so that they can 
enjoy advantages of free trade. Remaining obstacles to trade, most notably in 
the areas of agriculture and mobility of natural persons that are of the prime 
interest for the neighbours, are not likely to be removed in the near future. In 
this situation, a stake in the EU internal market seems to be the only viable op-
tion.28 Therefore, a specific feature of the Association Agreement between the 
EU and Ukraine is the creation of a free trade area that is “deep and compre-
hensive” with the finality of “internal market treatment”.  
What exactly does it mean for trade in services in general and for telecom-
munications services in particular? 
                                                 
27  Klaus Günter Deutsch, Looking for Partners. The EU’s free trade agreements in per-
spective. Deutsche Bank Research, 27 July 2012, p. 8. 
28  Ibid. 
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Due to the fact that both Parties are Members of the WTO/GATS, their 
commitments under the above mentioned agreements build a departure point 
for the Association Agreement. From the GATS perspective, the Association 
Agreement to an extent (in the part on trade in services) is a preferential trade 
agreement (PTA) and therefore needs to be notified to the WTO Council for 
Trade in Services (Article V.7 (a) GATS). It also needs to satisfy substantive 
requirements of Article V GATS. First, it shall have substantial sector cover-
age in terms of number of sectors covered, volume of trade affected and modes 
of supply. To meet this condition no mode of supply shall be a priori exclud-
ed. However, it is not clear how many sectors should be included or what 
threshold for volume of trade could be used so that the exact meaning of these 
requirements remains unclear.29 Second, in the sense of the GATS, a PTA pro-
vides for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination in the 
services sectors covered by such PTA, through elimination of existing discrim-
inatory measures and/or prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures. 
Third, the agreement shall be designed to further facilitate trade between its 
Parties; the level of barriers to trade in services shall not rise as a result of such 
agreement. As will be shown in the subsequent analysis, the EU-Ukraine As-
sociation Agreement does fulfil all three requirements. 
Under the Association Agreement the Parties are to progressively liberalise 
both the establishment and trade in services and to cooperate on electronic 
commerce (Article 85 (1) AA). Progressive liberalisation shall be ensured by 
the inbuilt review mechanism: the Parties undertake a commitment to review 
the established legal framework regularly and to further address remaining ob-
stacles through negotiations (Arts. 89 and 96 AA). For cross-border supply of 
services this review shall take into account transposition, implementation and 
enforcement of the EU acquis (Article 96 AA). Unfortunately, there are no in-
dications how often such reviews are to take place.  
In addressing trade in services, the Association Agreement tries to marry 
the EU and the WTO approaches. It departs from the vision of trade in services 
as supply of services in four Modes. Instead, it differentiates between estab-
lishment of legal and natural persons, trade in services that seems to include 
supply of services cross-border and via temporary presence of natural persons, 
and electronic commerce that is also considered cross-border supply of ser-
vices (Article 139 AA). Herewith, no GATS Mode of services supply is ex-
cluded, even though Mode 2 is not spelled out in the text of the Association 
Agreement and appears in schedules. 
                                                 
29  Matsushita, Mitsuo, Thomas Schoenbaum and Petros Mavroidis, The World Trade 
Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy. 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006, p. 579. 
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Enhancement of trade liberalisation is immediately obvious as it covers all 
services sectors so that the commitments of national treatment and market ac-
cess are not limited to only the listed sectors. A minimum of sectors is exclud-
ed from the scope of the agreement (Arts. 87 and 92 AA). Mining, manufactur-
ing and processing of nuclear materials and production of or trade in arms, 
munitions and war material are exempted from liberalisation in Mode 3 (estab-
lishment). Audio-visual services and national maritime cabotage are exempted 
both from liberalisation of establishment and liberalisation of what is termed 
trade in services. Domestic and international air transport services and some 
services directly related to the exercise of traffic rights (for instance, airport 
operation, computer reservation systems etc.) are not subject to the Association 
Agreement and will be covered by a separate agreement marking Ukraine’s 
accession to the Common Aviation Area.30  
Regarding establishment of legal and natural persons, the Parties agree to 
grant national or MFN treatment – whichever is the better – for establishment 
and operation of subsidiaries, branches and representations on the basis of rec-
iprocity (Article 88 AA). By contrast to the GATS, establishment goes far be-
yond services supply and covers “all economic activities” with the exception 
of the indicated above. In their respective schedules of commitments on estab-
lishment, the EU and its Member States (Annex XVI-A AA) and Ukraine (An-
nex XVI-C AA) foresee a number of restrictions. Horizontal restrictions, ap-
plicable to all sectors, refer to public utilities that may remain public monopo-
lies or be granted exclusive rights; to the necessity to be incorporated in the 
EU in order to be able to provide certain services; to limitations on purchase of 
real estate in individual Member States and to national requirements to share-
holding and/or board appointment. Sector-specific limitations are very diverse, 
but not extensive, and are preserved in such sensitive sectors as agriculture and 
fisheries, financial, health and educational services as well as energy and water 
supply. However, for establishments in telecommunications services sector no 
limitations are scheduled. 
With respect to market access through the cross-border supply of services 
(Mode 1) and national treatment of like services, provided in such way, and 
service suppliers, the Parties attach special schedules of commitments follow-
ing the scheduling practice under the GATS (Arts. 93-94 and Annexes XVI-B 
and XVI-E AA).  
Both Annex XVI-B and Annex XVI-E, containing sector-specific commit-
ments of the EU and Ukraine respectively, use the term “telecommunications 
                                                 
30  The respective agreement was initialed in November 2013 in Vilnius, but is not yet 
in force. See <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1181_en.htm> (accessed 
31.01.2015). 
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services”. While Ukraine closely follows its GATS schedule both as regards 
the terminology and the extent of commitments, the EU follows its scheduling 
practice in the recent free trade agreements with CARIFORUM countries of 
200831 and with the Republic of Korea of 201132, which corresponds to the 
Draft consolidated GATS schedule of 2006 submitted for certification to the 
Council for Trade in Services. The EU makes no direct references to the Cen-
tral Product Classification. First, telecommunications services are defined in 
negative: they do not cover the economic activity consisting of the provision of 
content which requires telecommunications services for its transport. Second, 
it is indicated that telecommunications services comprise satellite broadcasting 
transmission services33 and all services consisting of the transmission and re-
ception of signals by any electromagnetic means, excluding broadcasting. Fol-
lowing its internal approach, the EU does not make distinction between basic 
and value-added telecommunications, in compliance with the EU internal legal 
framework34, so that the commitments cover all services consisting of the 
transmission and reception of signals by any electromagnetic means. Neither 
Party imposes any restrictions on services supply in Modes 1 and 2. 
Mode 4 remains largely unliberalised. The positive achievement of the As-
sociation Agreement is the locking-in of the policies and rules in place. Cur-
rent requirements to entry and stay for key personnel, graduate trainees, busi-
ness service sellers, contractual services suppliers and independent profession-
als are listed in more detail than in the respective GATS schedules and (hope-
fully) will provide a basis for further liberalisation. The Parties cannot intro-
duce unilaterally more restrictive conditions than set out in the Association 
Agreement. 
All in all, the level of trade liberalisation and the Parties’ concessions in 
trade in telecommunications services do not go far beyond the commitments 
under the GATS. The value-added of this agreement seems to lie elsewhere, 
                                                 
31  Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, 
and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, OJ L 289 of 
30.10.2008. 
32  Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part , OJ L 127 of 14.05.2011. 
33  Those are telecommunications services consisting of the transmission and reception 
of radio and television broadcast by satellite, namely the uninterrupted chain of 
transmission via satellite required for the distribution of TV and radio programme 
signals to the general public. 
34  Compare Article 2 (c) of the Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services (Framework Directive), OJ L 108 of 
24.04.2002, pp. 33-50. 
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namely in its detailed provisions on domestic regulation. For individual ser-
vices sectors (computer services, postal and courier services, electronic com-
munications, financial services, transport services, electronic commerce) the 
Association Agreement foresees principles for the domestic regulatory frame-
work of the Parties, at times (for the last four sectors named) quite extensive 
and detailed. This research discusses exclusively the principles for domestic 
regulation for the telecommunications services sector that has been chosen as 
an example (Sub-Section 5 Section 5 Chapter 6 AA, further – Sub-Section 5). 
3.2 Terminological note on rules for domestic regulation 
The initial difficulty of this Sub-Section is that it does not use the term “tele-
communications” as the lists of commitments do. Instead, the term “electronic 
communications” is used, which in its turn is absent from the lists. The defini-
tions of the two terms differ. According to Article 115 (2) AA, electronic 
communication services are services consisting of the transmission and recep-
tion of electro-magnetic signals and normally provided for remuneration, ex-
cept for broadcasting, which does not cover the economic activity consisting in 
the provision of content that requires telecommunications for its transport. This 
definition is misleading because it creates an impression that electronic com-
munications are different from, even somewhat unrelated to telecommunica-
tions services.  
This definition is obviously borrowed from the EU’s internal legal frame-
work on electronic communications. However, for reasons one can only guess, 
most likely for the sake of simplification, it has been altered and has lost its 
original clarity and precision. In its original form, the notion of electronic 
communications services covers all services consisting wholly or mainly in the 
conveyance of signals, but excluding services that provide content or exercise 
editorial control over it. By this definition, telecommunications services are 
part of electronic communications services.35 
The terminological mix-up has different practical implications for the Par-
ties. For the EU, it makes no difference. Firstly, it understands telecommunica-
tions broadly in its own commitments’ list. Secondly, it considers telecommu-
nications a part of electronic communications. Thirdly, as will be shown fur-
ther below, all the requirements of Sub-Section 5 are based on the EU’s inter-
nal legal and regulatory framework for electronic communications.  
For Ukraine, the unclear terminology may result in unforeseen commit-
ments. Sub-Section 5 applies not only to services specified in the lists of com-
                                                 
35  See the full definition in Article 2 (c) Framework Directive. 
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mitments, but to all services liberalized under Sections 2, 3 and 4 Chapter 6 
(Article 115 (1) AA), which means to all services sectors except for the ones 
explicitly excluded. A likely interpretation of electronic communications is 
that it includes telecommunications, but is broader than this and covers also 
other forms of communication. In such a case, the requirements of Sub-Section 
5 apply not only to domestic regulation of all telecommunications services 
listed, but also to other – unidentified in the list of commitments – services. 
For instance, electronic communications services may include provision of 
private networks, Internet telecommunications services (access to Internet and 
traffic over Internet, provision of distributed computer networks similar to In-
ternet), Internet backbone services, Internet access services (wired and wire-
less), satellite communications services and other services. 
All other definitions of Article 115 AA – public communication network, 
electronic communication network, regulatory authority, service supplier, in-
terconnection, universal service, access, end-user, local loop – are borrowed, 
mostly in an unchanged form, from Article 2 Framework Directive and reflect 
the current regulatory state of the art in the EU. These terms represent a poten-
tial difficulty for Ukraine in so far as they all are based on the notion of elec-
tronic communications. 
Interestingly, the Association Agreements with Moldova and Georgia are 
much more clear terminologically: in both of them the term “electronic com-
munications services” is used consistently and defined in the same way as in 
the EU Framework Directive (Article 231 EU-Moldova AA and Article 104 
EU-Georgia AA). 
3.3 Principles for domestic regulatory framework for  
telecommunications services: An overview of individual principles 
Even though Sub-Section 5 claims to contain principles for domestic regula-
tion, its provisions are formulated in the form of requirements and are very de-
tailed. Without a single exception, all the requirements come straight from the 
EU’s legal and regulatory framework for electronic communications, and even 
their wording often remains the same as in the EU Directives. In this context, 
even though every single Article starts with the words “the Parties shall en-
sure”, what actually meant is that Ukraine shall bring its legislation in compli-
ance (unless, of course, there are requirements of non-discrimination and im-
partiality). All EU Member States have already implemented the respective 
provisions of the EU regulatory package of 2002 in their national law. This 
turns the Association Agreement into an asymmetric one with the EU export-
ing its regulatory model and Ukraine adjusting to it. 
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This is in stark contrast with the latest FTA agreements of the EU (for in-
stance, with Korea and CARIFORUM countries) that use a more reserved lan-
guage reminiscent of the GATS and formulate regulatory principles in a more 
balanced manner.36 However, the asymmetry makes sense in case of Ukraine: 
regulatory adjustments are necessary to reduce non-tariff barriers to services 
trade, and Ukraine needs to make them if it wishes to increase its share of ser-
vices exports to the EU – the biggest market and trade partner.37 Besides, for 
alignment of Ukrainian rules to the European ones speaks the underlying moti-
vation for the Association Agreement: as a long-term objective Ukraine wishes 
to join the EU, and adoption of the acquis communautaire is one of the central 
preconditions for it. 
Similarly to Article 3 Framework Directive, Article 116 (1) AA requires 
creation of an independent regulator for electronic communications that is le-
gally distinct and functionally independent from any service provider. If state 
ownership of or control over a supplier of public communications networks or 
services is retained, effective structural separation of the regulatory function 
from activities associated with ownership or control shall be ensured. The reg-
ulatory body shall have sufficient powers to carry out the following tasks: 
 to carry out an analysis of relevant product and service markets under 
conditions of Article 118 AA (Article 116 (4) AA); 
 to identify and designate service suppliers with significant market power 
and to impose on them, maintain, amend or withdraw specific regulatory 
obligations as required by Article 118 AA (Article 116 (5) AA); 
 to resolve disputes between suppliers of electronic communications re-
garding their rights and obligations resulting from the Association 
Agreement by issuing a binding decision (Article 123 (1) AA); 
 to coordinate its efforts with other regulatory bodies in case where a dis-
pute between suppliers concerns cross-border services provision (Article 
123 (3) AA). 
The Association Agreement aims to facilitate the taking-up of activity in the 
electronic communications sector and the subsequent operations. Therefore, 
some of its provisions have a deregulatory character aiming at minimising “red 
tape” limitations. In this context, Article 117 (1) AA requires that an authorisa-
tion for provision of electronic communications shall be in the form of mere 
notification and/or registration “as much as possible”. Licences can be required 
                                                 
36  Compare to Arts. 94-102 EU-CARIFORUM Agreement and Arts. 7.27-7.36 EU-
Korea Agreement. 
37  See structure and dynamics of Ukrainian trade in services at Ukrainian State Statis-
tics Service: <http://ukrstat.org/en>. 
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for attribution of numbers and frequencies (Article 117 (2) AA),38 subject to a 
number of conditions ensuring a transparent, impartial and non-burdensome 
process of their issuance (Article 117 (3) AA).  
Interconnection of electronic communications networks and access to net-
work facilities and services of another supplier have been traditionally heavy 
regulated issues, especially where there is a state-controlled or state-owned 
incumbent operator. Article 118 (1) AA intends to reduce regulation in this 
field by suggesting that interconnection “should in principle be agreed” in 
commercial negotiation between the legal persons concerned and, therefore, be 
a subject to contracts law / civil law. Regulatory intervention is warranted only 
where a relevant market is considered not effectively competitive. In such a 
case, the regulatory body needs to designate providers with significant market 
power and may impose certain obligations on it in relation to interconnection 
and/or access (Article 118 (3) AA). 
The obligations to be imposed are designed to curb market power of the in-
cumbent in order to create a level-playing field for competitors, especially for 
new entrants. The obligations are based on the EU experience in creation of the 
internal market for electronic communications and correspond fully to the ob-
ligations list the EC Access Directive39. The regulatory authority can impose 
one or more of the following obligations:  
 obligation of non-discrimination (compare to Article 10 Access Di-
rective);  
 for a vertically integrated undertaking – obligation to make transparent 
its wholesale prices and its internal transfer prices (compare to Article 
11 (1) Access Directive); 
 obligation to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, specific 
network elements and associated facilities including unbundled access to 
the local loop (compare to Article 12 (1) (a) Access Directive); 
 obligation to provide specified services on a wholesale basis for resale 
by third parties; to grant open access to key technologies that are indis-
pensable for the interoperability of services or virtual network services; 
to provide co-location or other forms of facility sharing; to provide spec-
ified services necessary to ensure interoperability of end-to-end services 
                                                 
38  Unfortunately, these two cases are not presented as exceptions so that licenses can 
be also used in other cases, even as authorization, if the licensing procedure com-
plies with the requirements of Article 117 (3) AA. 
39  Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities, OJ L 108 of 24.04.2002, pp. 7-20. 
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to users; to provide access to operational support systems in order to en-
sure fair competition in services provision; to interconnect networks or 
network facilities (compare to Article 12 (1) (d)-(i) Access Directive);  
 obligations relating to cost recovery and price controls, including obliga-
tions for cost orientations of prices and obligations concerning cost ac-
counting systems (compare to Article 13 (1) Access Directive); 
 obligation to publish the specific obligations imposed on a service sup-
plier by the regulatory authority identifying the specific product/service 
and geographical market; 
 obligations of transparency (compare to Article 9 (2) Access Directive). 
Frequent mentioning of competition and competitors, use of the criterion of 
“effective competition” (Arts. 118 (3) and 116 AA), “fair competition” (Article 
118 (3) (d) AA) and “sustainable competition” (Article 118 (3) (c) AA) for the 
analysis of a relevant market, the evident attempts to keep in check activities of 
suppliers with significant market power – this all allows to conclude that the 
electronic communications market of both Parties shall be subject to regulation 
by general competition law. (According to the provision of Chapter 10 Title IV 
AA, Ukrainian competition law will have to be significantly amended and will 
become similar to the EU competition law.) In this context, national regulatory 
authorities will identify individual markets that lack effective competition and 
shall therefore be subject to regulatory intervention. Indicative lists of such 
relevant product and services markets are contained in Annexes XIX and XX 
to Chapter 6 for the EU and Ukraine, respectively. For the EU, the indicative 
list naturally corresponds to the Commission Recommendation of 17 Decem-
ber 2007 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic com-
munications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Di-
rective 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a com-
mon regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and ser-
vices40 and encompasses seven markets. The indicative list for Ukraine is 17 
markets long and is a copy of the previous version of the Commission Rec-
ommendation on relevant markets subject to ex ante regulation41, which was in 
force immediately after the liberalisation of the market for electronic commu-
nications in the EU. Both indicative lists are subject to “regular revision” by 
each Party individually, although in the case of Ukraine such revision is linked 
                                                 
40  OJ L 344 of 28.12.2007, pp. 33-50. 
41  Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service 
markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regula-
tion in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communication networks 
and services, OJ L 114 of 08.05.2003, pp. 45-49. 
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to the approximation of its laws to the EU acquis (Fn. 1 to Article 116 (4) 
AA). The linkage is not closer explained so that it is not clear whether Ukraine 
can review the list only in case of progress in the approximation process. 
With regards to the analysis of product and services markets, many ques-
tions arise, both for Ukraine and the EU. For instance, it is not clear what is 
meant by “effective competition” that is the standard of assessment of compe-
tition on the relevant market (Arts. 118 (3) and 116 AA) and how it relates to 
“fair competition” (Article 118 (3) (d) AA) and “sustainable competition” (Ar-
ticle 118 (3) (c) AA), that are criteria used for imposition of individual obliga-
tions on undertakings with significant market power. Of course, this is less of a 
difficulty for the EU with its well developed competition law and practice and 
extensive case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). The same cannot 
be said about Ukraine; besides, at least according to the current obligations, 
Ukraine is not supposed to implement the complete competition law acquis 
and, in particular, it is not supposed to follow the interpretations of the CJEU 
(see Chapter 10 Title IV, especially Arts. 253-256 AA). 
Article 119 (1) AA repeats the additional commitments of Section 6 GATS 
Reference Paper undertaken by the Parties for administration of scarce re-
sources (principles of objectivity, proportionality, transparency, non-
discrimination and timeliness). Subsequently, more attention is paid to the ef-
fective management of radio frequencies that are a critical asset for the devel-
opment of mobile electronic communications technologies, but are also neces-
sary for other uses (broadcasting, security). Assignment of radio frequencies 
needs to be done in such a way that optimises their use and facilitates the de-
velopment of competition (Article 119 (2) AA). 
Article 120 AA that deals with universal service provisions by the Parties is 
almost completely identical with the respective provisions in the EU-
CARIFORUM Agreement.42 Paragraphs 1 and 2 repeat Section 3 GATS Ref-
erence Paper. Paragraphs 3 and 4 contain a summary of the EU universal ser-
vice instrument.43 While the definition of the scope is at a complete discretion 
of the Parties, correspondence of all other elements and their compliance with 
market liberalisation is ensured. Any service supplier can be designated for 
universal service provision through an efficient, transparent, objective and 
                                                 
42  Only a few words are omitted in the Ukrainian Association Agreement by compari-
son to Article 100 EU-CARIFORUM Agreement. This has no bearing on the overall 
meaning. 
43  Compare to the main elements of the Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relat-
ing to electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 108 of 24.04.2002. pp. 
51-77. 
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non-discriminatory mechanism. There is guidance how to determine the net 
cost of universal service provision and whether it is an unfair burden for the 
designated supplier. There is also an indication of two financing mechanisms 
for universal service provision. There is a requirement that directories of all 
subscribers shall be available to users, but from the wording of Article 120 (4) 
AA it is not completely clear whether it constitutes a part of universal service. 
This form of a provision on universal service is not very common for EU’s 
free trade agreements. Most of them replicate Section 3 GATS Reference Pa-
per.44 Only via the Ukrainian Association Agreement and the CARIFORUM 
Agreement the EU tries to export its concept of universal service provision. 
Considering the detailed character of the above provisions and the fact that 
they effectively represent requirements to the Ukrainian legal and regulatory 
framework, the “principles for the regulatory framework” as they are called in 
Article 115 (1) AA in fact aim at regulatory approximation. As mentioned 
above, all the provisions of Sub-Section 5 are extracted from the EU’s regula-
tory framework. In order to comply with these provisions, Ukraine will have to 
carry out profound reforms (see Section 4 of this paper) that consist in imple-
menting EU’s rules – as reproduced in the Association Agreement – in the 
Ukrainian legislation. This regulatory approximation in disguise is supported 
by the rules on real regulatory approximation to be discussed below in Section 
3.4 of this paper: as will be shown, the parts of the acquis to be implemented 
are directly relevant to ensure compliance with the domestic regulation re-
quirements. 
3.4 Regulatory approximation in the field of electronic  
communications 
Under the Association Agreement, Ukraine is obligated to align its legislation 
to that of the EU acquis with regard to four services sectors: financial services, 
postal and courier services, international maritime transport and electronic 
communications (for the latter sectors see Article 124 AA). By contrast to oth-
er provisions, the obligation of regulatory approximation enters into force on 
the date of signing of the Association Agreement, not upon ratification.  
Differently from association agreements leading to accession, the EU’s As-
sociation Agreement with Ukraine does not foresee alignment of Ukrainian 
laws and regulations with all the acquis. Instead, it focuses on the core issues 
of specific services sectors that are important for trade and economic relations 
                                                 
44  See, for example, Article 7.34 EU-Korea Agreement, Article 115 EU-Chile Agree-
ment of 2002, Article 147 EU-Andean Community Agreement of 2012. 
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between the Parties, in the first line.45 This is a reasonable approach: due to the 
differences in the level of economic development of the partners and consider-
ing the fact that Ukraine is going to be eventually integrated into a much big-
ger European internal market, in anticipation of possible difficulties it is to 
Ukraine’s benefit to adopt EU’s standards, to modernise its legal system and 
economy, focusing on its strengths, to develop necessary infrastructure and to 
support the most future-oriented services sectors.  
Following this approach, for the telecommunications sector46, Annex XVII 
AA contains not only lists of legislative acts of the EU to be transposed into 
Ukrainian legislation, but names the exact Articles and/or specifies the exact 
issues to be borrowed from these acts. Thus, according to the Appendix XVII-
3, Ukraine is to transpose in its national law selected provisions of five major 
Directives regulating the internal market for electronic communications ser-
vices – Framework Directive, Authorisation Directive47, Access Directive, 
Universal Service Directive and Competition Directive48 – and the Decision on 
radio frequency policy in the EU49. For example, from the Framework Di-
rective the following issues need to be transposed: 
 definition of the relevant product and service markets susceptible to ex 
ante regulation, 
 analysis of the above mentioned markets with a view to determine 
whether significant market power exists on them, 
 independence and administrative capacity of the national regulator, 
 public consultation procedures for new regulatory measures, and  
 mechanisms for appeal against decisions of the national regulator. 
Do these and other specific provisions to be harmonised indeed constitute the 
necessary core? For the electronic communications sector this question can be 
                                                 
45  This is an approach adopted for all areas of the cooperation under the Association 
Agreement, not only for trade in services. 
46  Interestingly, there is a terminological switch so that Annex XVII refers once again 
to telecommunications services. 
47  Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 
108 of 24.04.2002, pp. 21-32. 
48  Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the 
markets for electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 249 of 
17.09.2002, pp. 21-26. 
49  Decision 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the European Commu-
nity, OJ L 108 of 24.04.2002, pp. 1-6. 
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answered in the affirmative. The listed specific provisions contain notions 
(significant market power, universal service, network facilities) and principles 
(independence of the regulator, transparency, non-discrimination) central for 
EU legal framework. These fundamentals of the EU legal and regulatory 
framework are likely to remain the same while details evolve. They effectuate 
the adoption of the EU’s system and logic in regulation of electronic commu-
nications markets by Ukraine so that a leading role is assumed by strong com-
petition law with corrective targeted intervention of a (strong) regulator to 
support or restore effective competition. Additionally, regulation and law 
should assume an enabling role and create conditions and incentives for com-
petition by, for instance, strengthening users’ rights, introducing number port-
ability and ensuring efficient use of radio spectrum. These measures should 
allow for a development of domestic economy and competition and prepare 
Ukrainian electronic communications providers for the regulatory environment 
and fierce competition in the EU internal market so that Ukraine can actually 
sustain free trade with the EU. They also support Ukrainian efforts to fulfil its 
liberalisation commitments under the Association Agreement and the GATS 
and they serve to substantiate rules on domestic regulation. 
The focus on the core issues allows for a certain degree of discretion and 
renders the Association Agreement more flexible. On the one hand, Ukraine is 
free to continue approximation of its laws beyond the minimum suggested by 
the Association Agreement (what presumably should be rewarded by the EU 
with enhanced market access). On the other hand, the Annexes can be amend-
ed or new Annexes can be negotiated with further harmonisation guidelines 
depending on the progress and taking into account the evolution of the EU ac-
quis. This is in line with the principle of progressive liberalisation and the ob-
ligation to review the established legal framework regularly and to further ad-
dress remaining obstacles through negotiations (Arts. 89 and 96 AA). 
The positive implications are, however, overshadowed by the lack of legal 
certainty with regard to the achievement of a necessary level of harmonisation 
so that the question of finality of regulatory approximation remains open. Ac-
cording to Article 3 para. 3 Annex XVII AA, the Trade Committee50 has the 
competence to extend the lists of regulatory acts in Appendices to Annex XVII 
that are to be transposed into Ukrainian legislation and to decide on an indica-
tive period for their transposition. From the wording of the named provision it 
is not clear whether the Trade Committee may add only new EU acts that have 
been adopted since the text of the Association Agreement was initialled or 
whether it may add any act it considers necessary for further regulatory ap-
                                                 
50  The Trade Committee is the Association Committee meeting in Trade configuration 
(see Article 464 AA in conjunction with Article 465 para. 4 and Article 29 para. 4 AA). 
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proximation. Also, there are no criteria or conditions for the addition of new 
EU acts. Under these circumstances, the limits of regulatory approximation 
become less clearly defined: does the Association Agreement intend full har-
monisation or only partial approximation and how is this part defined? All this 
has serious implications for an assessment of proper approximation and for the 
opening of the EU internal market for Ukraine as will be discussed in Section 5 
of this paper. 
Before turning to problematic questions of procedural nature, it is of benefit 
to follow the transposition list of the Appendix XVII-3 to the end. Even though 
the title of this Appendix is “Rules applicable to telecommunications services”, 
one can find Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 20 November 1998 on the legal protection of services based on, or con-
sisting of, conditional access51, the e-Commerce Directive52 and the Electronic 
Signatures Directive53, all of which cover neither telecommunications services 
in the sense of the Ukrainian list of commitments nor electronic communica-
tions in the sense of the EU framework. On the contrary, they refer to broad-
casting services and information society services that are explicitly excluded 
from the scope of electronic communications (Article 2 (c) Framework Di-
rective). The implementation period for these Directives is much shorter: two 
to three years. At the same time, Article 140 AA on regulatory aspects of elec-
tronic commerce is cautiously phrased and speaks of maintaining a dialogue 
between the Parties on recognition of certificates of electronic signatures, pro-
tection of consumers in e-commerce and other issues of e-commerce. Clearly, 
the listed Directives are of central importance for the development of electron-
ic trade and business, but they are not part of the electronic communications 
sector. Rather, they build foundations for a downstream market. Strictly speak-
ing, approximation of these rules is necessary for opening up the market of 
electronic services. 
                                                 
51  OJ L 320 of 28.11.1998, pp. 54-57. 
52  Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce in the Internal Market, OJ L 178 of 17.07.2000, pp. 1-16. 
53  Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 Decem-
ber 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures, OJ L 13 of 
19.01.2000, pp. 12-20. 
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4. Ukrainian legal and regulatory framework for  
telecommunications sector 
This section examines the legal and regulatory framework governing the tele-
communications sector of Ukraine, namely provision of telecommunications 
services and network infrastructure, with the aim to identify to what extent 
Ukraine has already reformed its legal and regulatory framework and what 
specific work is still necessary in order to comply with Ukrainian’s GATS 
commitments and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement provisions. 
The study starts with a brief overview of the main legislative acts regulating 
the telecommunications sector of Ukraine and explanations of some basic fea-
tures of Ukrainian telecommunications Law. The current state of market liber-
alisation is analysed in terms of whether the market has been in fact liberalised 
and to what extent sector specific regulation is employed.  
4.1 Overview of the legal basis 
Key goals and strategies for the development of telecommunications networks 
of common use under market conditions and for attainment of strategic inter-
ests and competitiveness of Ukraine on the international market are defined in 
the Telecommunications Development Concept54 adopted by the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine in 2006. Within this policy framework, main legislative 
acts regulating the provision of telecommunications networks and services in 
Ukraine are the Law of Ukraine “On Telecommunications”55 (Telecommunica-
tions Law), the Law of Ukraine “On Radio Frequency Resource of Ukraine”56 
(Radio Frequency Law) and the Rules for Rendering and Obtaining of Tele-
communications Services57 (Telecommunications Services Rules).  
The Telecommunications Law sets out general objectives, principles and 
notions for the telecommunications market regulation as well as an institution-
al framework for regulation, governmental administration and operation of the 
telecommunications industry and telecommunications networks of common 
use. More specifically, it contains interconnection rules, licensing requirements 
and procedure, terms and conditions for the public telecommunications ser-
                                                 
54  Конценція розвитку телекомунікацій в Україні. Approved by the order of the 
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Kyiv, 7 June 2006, N 316-p. 
55  Закон України “Про телекомунікації”, Kyiv, 18 November 2003, N 1280-IV. 
56  Закон України “Про радіочастотний ресурс України”, Kyiv, 1 June, N 1770-III. 
57  Постанова Кабінету Міністрів України “Про затвердження Правіл надання та 
отримання телекомунікаційних послуг”, Kyiv, 11 April, N 295. 
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vices provision, regulation of the numbering resource and tariff regulations. 
The Telecommunications Law prescribes the following main principles for 
activities in the telecommunications field: to ensure an access to and availabil-
ity of public (universal) telecommunications services of defined quality and 
range at an affordable price to all consumers in the entire territory of Ukraine, 
to guarantee interconnection and sustainability of the telecommunications net-
works and promote competition, to provide an efficient use and management 
of scarce resources, and to ensure efficiency and transparency of the telecom-
munications regulation ( Article 6 of the Telecommunications Law). 
Article 1 of the Telecommunications Law defines telecommunications as 
transmission, emission and/or reception of signs, signals, written text, images 
and sounds or messages of any kind by radio, wire, optical or other electro-
magnetic systems. Accordingly, a telecommunications service is a product of 
the activity of a telecommunications operator and/or provider aimed at satisfy-
ing consumer demands in the telecommunication area.  
According to 38 of the Telecommunications Law, individuals and legal en-
tities providing telecommunications services are divided into telecommunica-
tions service operators (telecom operators) and telecommunications service 
providers (telecom providers). The difference between the two is that telecom 
operators are allowed to use and maintain telecommunications networks, to 
obtain licences and numbering resource, to assign the numbering resource to 
end-users (secondary allocation) and to interconnect telecommunication net-
works, but telecom providers do not have these possibilities. In order to be able 
to provide telecommunications services, telecommunications service providers 
have to enter into an agreement with a telecom operator who is an Ukrainian 
resident, and they further act on the basis of a telecommunications license of 
this operator covering the particular type of activity. Additionally, telecom 
providers have to request to enter their details into the register of telecom op-
erators and telecom providers (Register),58 managed by the National Commis-
sion for the State Regulation of Communications and Informatisation 
(NCCIR). 
Terms and conditions of telecommunications services provision are also 
regulated by various by-laws adopted by competent state authorities. For in-
stance, the Telecommunications Services Rules aim at the protection of the 
rights of end-users of telecom services and govern the interaction between tel-
ecommunication operators and providers, on the one hand, and consumers of 
services, on the other. They also contain main license terms of rendering tele-
                                                 
58  Порядок ведення реєстру операторів, провайдерів телекомунікацій. Approved 
by the Decision of the NCCIR, Kyiv, 1 November 2012, N 560. 
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communication services and set out general principles and procedures for tele-
communication services provision. 
The Radio Frequency Law establishes general rules for allocation and use 
of the radio frequency spectrum. It lays down competences of governmental 
bodies in regulating, controlling and monitoring the use of the radio frequency 
spectrum and establishes liability for its misuse.  
4.2 Regulatory authorities 
Pursuant to Article 13 of the Telecommunications Law, several governmental 
bodies are competent to regulate the telecommunications industry in Ukraine: 
the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU)59, the National Commission for 
State Regulation of Communications and Informatisation of Ukraine 
(NCCIR)60, the Ukrainian State Centre of Radio Frequencies (UCRF)61, the 
State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection in 
Ukraine (State Service)62, and others.  
The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine – the supreme body of executive pow-
er of Ukraine – is responsible for realisation of the state policy and state regu-
lation of telecommunications sector as a whole as well as operation and admin-
istration of the state-owned entities and facilities in the telecommunications 
domain (Article 14 of the Telecommunications Law). It directs and coordinates 
activities of other executive authorities in the telecommunications area, but 
also ensures protection of competition and equal market conditions for under-
takings of all types of ownership.  
The NCCIR acts as a principal regulator and develops the whole range of 
implementing instructions and regulations (Article 17 of the Telecommunica-
tions Law). The NCCR consists of the Chairman of the Commission and six 
Commission Members, who are appointed to and dismissed from their posi-
tions by the President of Ukraine. The NCCIR is structurally separate from the 
government, it is subordinated directly to the President of Ukraine and ac-
                                                 
59  Закон України “Про Кабінет Міністрів України”, Kyiv, 27 February 2014, N794 
– VII.  
60  Указ Президента України “Про Національну комісію, що здійснює державне 
регулювання у сфері зв'язку та інформатизації”. Кіуv, 23 November 2011, N 
1067/2011. 
61  Статья 16 Закона України “Про радіочастотний ресурс України”, Kyiv, 1 June 
2000, N1770-III. 
62  Закон України “Про Державну службу спеціального зв’язку та захисту 
інформації України”, Kyiv, 23 February 2006, N3475-IV. 
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countable to the Parliament of Ukraine – Verkhovna Rada. It is also legally 
distinct and functionally independent from any telecoms provider. However, 
the NCCIR cannot be considered a completely independent body because its 
independence is not formally established in the Telecommunications Law and 
because its members are appointed and dismissed by the President of Ukraine 
meaning that this can happen in an arbitrary manner. 
The NCCIR possesses extensive competences that allow it to fully regulate, 
monitor and supervise activities in the telecommunications market. It allocates 
the radio frequency spectrum and numbering resource, to ensure their effective 
use; establishes licensing and registration procedures; sets tariffs for public 
telecommunication services, including special tariffs for socially disadvan-
taged people, and controls quality of service; regulates interconnection and so 
on (Article 18 of the Telecommunications Law). The NCCIR can impose pen-
alties on telecom operators and providers for violations of legal and regulatory 
provisions. Any decision by the NCCIR can be appealed to a court by an indi-
vidual or a legal entity.  
Its legal status does not allow the NCCIR to initiate legislative proposals or 
to submit draft laws, related to the regulation of the telecommunications sector, 
directly to the Parliament of Ukraine. However, in accordance with Article 18 
of the Telecommunications Law and paragraphs 4.4 and 4.5 of the Regulation 
of the NCCIR, the NCCIR can make suggestions for legislative proposals and 
standards in the spheres of its competences to the President and the Cabinet of 
the Ministers of Ukraine.  
In accordance with "The procedure of market analysis of transmission ser-
vices and identifying operators with significant market power"63, the NCCIR 
conducts an analysis of the telecommunications market and prepares sugges-
tions for legal acts and state regulation to ensure market balance, improvement 
of conditions for competition. The market analysis results in a NCCIR decision 
that identifies separate markets of telecommunications services and determines 
operators and/or providers with significant market power. This can further lead 
to imposition of specific obligations upon such operators and providers, for 
instance, application of special tariffs set by the NCCIR or obligation of inter-
connection with a telecommunications network of another operator at the 
points specified in the catalogue offers of telecommunications operators (Arti-
cles 18 and 59 of the Telecommunications Law).  
However, the NCCIR cannot impose any obligations on undertakings in or-
                                                 
63  Рішення Національної комісії з питань регулювання зв’язку України “Порядок 
аналізу ринків послуг пропуску трафіка та визначення операторів 
телекомунікацій з істотною ринковою первагою” Kiyv, 25 August 2011, N444. 
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der to control their anti-competitive behaviour under competition law. This 
competence is reserved for the national competition authority – the Antimo-
nopoly Committee of Ukraine64. The NCCIR can only impose penalties when a 
telecommunications undertaking violates conditions of its license or does not 
comply with price regulation. To this end, the NCCIR lacks competences to 
regulate all aspects of the telecommunications market and to respond to non-
competitive practices. In the cases of breach of competition law and when 
there are reasoned suspicion or signs of abuse of dominant position on the tele-
coms market, the NCCIR relies on the powers of the Antimonopoly Commit-
tee. In such situations it has to hand over all materials of its analysis with the 
request to examine whether there is effective competition on the market (Arti-
cle 18 of the Telecommunications Law). 
The NCCIR exercises its activities in compliance with the principle of 
openness (Article 22 of the Telecommunications Law). Comprehensive infor-
mation about the NCCIR, its activities and adopted documents is publicly 
available by the way of official publication and via the NCCIR’s website (also 
in English)65. The NCCIR establishes conditions to organise public participa-
tion at its meetings and consultations for decision-making processes. One of 
the common practices in this regard is the organisation of round tables to en-
hance an interaction between the NCCIR and the public.66 
Under Article 11 of the Radio Frequency Law, the Ukrainian State Centre 
of Radio Frequencies is the central executive body to carry out administration 
and control over the radio spectrum resource of Ukraine. The UCRF is to en-
sure the effective use of the radio frequencies in Ukraine and for this it is en-
trusted with allocation and use of the radio frequency spectrum. In its activity 
the UCRF is subordinated to and supervised by the NCCIR (Article 14 of the 
Radio Frequency Law). 
The State Service is one more central executive body in the telecommunica-
tions sector that is largely responsible for standard-setting, establishment of 
precise requirements for networks, services and equipment, and for their con-
                                                 
64  Закон України “Про Антимонопольний комітет України”, Kyiv, 26 November 
1993, N3659 – XII. 
65  See <http://nkrzi.gov.ua>. 
66  To illustrate this activity, one of the recent examples was a round-table on the topic: 
"Problems of Communications and Informatisation" the NCCIR held on June 26, 
2014. Participants discussed recommendations and provided proposals to develop 
and refine a number of legal acts, including the draft on the basic principles of state 
regulation, changes to the Concept of development of telecommunications in 
Ukraine, and the draft of Law of Ukraine "On the Fundamentals of information and 
communication infrastructure". 
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trol and certification. Besides, it develops and implements state technical poli-
cy in the field of cryptographic and technical information security, telecom-
munications, and radio frequency resource of Ukraine (Article 14 of the Law 
of Ukraine "On the State Service for Special Communications and Information 
Protection of Ukraine").  
4.3 Providing telecommunications services in Ukraine 
Article 6 of the Telecommunications Law reserves the exclusive right to pro-
vide telecommunications services for Ukrainian entities. Legal entities shall be 
located in the Ukrainian territory and incorporated in accordance with Ukraini-
an laws, and natural persons who are business entities shall have permanent 
residence in the territory of Ukraine. At the same time, Ukraine is open to for-
eign equity ownership and has no restrictions on foreign direct or indirect 
ownership of companies or investment in the telecoms sector.  
4.3.1 Licensing 
Licensing is a key tool of telecommunications regulation to control market en-
try and, therefore, can be used to shape the market by limiting the number of 
players and/or types of services provided. Licensing can also be used to create 
or enhance competition in the market by imposing certain obligations on in-
cumbents with a view to equalize the market conditions for various players and 
ensure the provision of socially desirable services or outcomes, such as access 
for disabled users or universal service. 
In the legal framework of Ukraine general authorisation regime in form of 
notification had been applicable until the Market Access Law was adopted in 
201167. The latter introduced a regime of individual authorisation. By contrast 
to the old procedure that required only a prior notification with the NCCIR, 
registration in the NCCIR Register of operators and providers of telecommuni-
cations and could be accomplished within a week, the Market Access Law 
foresees different procedures. An undertaking may operate on the telecommu-
nications market of Ukraine upon the simple entering into the Register, if the 
intended activities can be carried out without a license. In such a case, an un-
dertaking must comply with the Telecommunications Services Rules. Thus 
business entities, intending to engage in licensed activities, must submit an ap-
plication for entry into the Register and an application for license to the 
                                                 
67  Закон України “Про внесення змін до деяких законів України щодо спрощення 
умов доступу на ринок телекомунікаційних послуг”. Kyiv, 5 July 2011, N 3566-VI. 
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NCCIR accompanied by a number of documents. This makes it overall more 
complicated to operate within the Ukrainian market as a telecommunications 
operator than a telecommunications provider. 
An exhaustive list of telecommunications services subject to licensing is 
contained in Article 42 of the Telecommunication Law. Basically, only the ac-
tivities of operators, not providers are listed there: 
 local, inter-city and international fixed-line telephone services, with 
the right to maintain and operate telecommunications networks and 
lease communications channels; 
 local, inter-city and international fixed-line telephone services using 
wireless access to telecommunications networks, with the right to 
maintain and operate telecommunications networks and lease com-
munications channels; 
 mobile services, with the right to maintain and operate telecommuni-
cations networks and lease communications channels; 
 maintenance and operation of a telecommunications network, on-air 
and cable broadcasting and television networks. 
Due to specific characteristics of telecommunications services subject to li-
censing, there are five different types of license conditions68, addressing each 
                                                 
68  Ліцензійні умови здійснення діяльності у сфері телекомунікацій з надання 
послуг фіксованого телефонного зв'язку з правом технічного обслуговування 
та експлуатації телекомунікаційних мереж і надання в користування каналів 
електрозв'язку: місцевого, міжміського, міжнародного. Approved by the Deci-
sion of the NCCIR. Kyiv, 10 December 2009, N 1789; Ліцензійні умови 
здійснення діяльності у сфері телекомунікацій з надання послуг фіксованого 
телефонного зв'язку з використанням безпроводового доступу до 
телекомунікаційної мережі з правом технічного обслуговування і надання в 
користування каналів електрозв'язку: місцевого, міжміського, міжнародного. 
Approved by the Decision of the NCCIR. Kyiv, 29 July 2010, N348; Ліцензійні 
умови здійснення діяльності у сфері телекомунікацій з надання послуг 
рухомого (мобільного) телефонного зв'язку з правом технічного 
обслуговування та експлуатації телекомунікаційних мереж і надання в 
користування каналів електрозв'язку. Approved by the Decision of the NCCIR. 
Kyiv, 26 January 2006, N176; Ліцензійні умови здійснення діяльності у сфері 
телекомунікацій з надання послуг з надання в користування каналів 
електрозв'язку. Approved by the Decision of the NCCIR. Kyiv, 07 December 2007, 
N1017; Лiцензійні умови здійснення діяльності у сфері телекомунікацій з 
надання послуг з технічного обслуговування і експлуатації 
телекомунікаційних мереж, мереж ефірного теле- та радіомовлення, 
проводового радіомовлення та телемереж. Approved by the Decision of the 
NCCIR. Kyiv, 11 November 2010, N513. 
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of them. The requirements, set out by the license conditions can be broadly 
categorised as organizational, qualifying, technological and “other” conditions. 
Organizational, qualification and technological conditions are uniform and ap-
plicable to all telecommunications services. The “other” conditions are indi-
vidual obligations and vary broadly depending on the type of service to be 
provided. They are included additionally in the licence where necessary and 
refer to the use of network infrastructure, mandatory interconnection require-
ments, provision of specific technical infrastructure and conditions for specific 
monitoring, etc.  
Under Art 46 of the Telecommunications Law, the NCCIR shall take a de-
cision on issuing a license within 30 working days since the registration of an 
application for a license. If the licensed activity requires the use of limited re-
sources (radio frequency or/and numbering resource) this period can be ex-
tended up to 60 working days. In case of a refusal, substantive grounds shall be 
provided. 
Due to the limited availability of radio spectrum, the need to protect reve-
nue flows of a recently privatized incumbent, and in order to ensure its ability 
to penetrate geographically more broadly with the lower infrastructure cost by 
installing new or upgrading aged fixed lines infrastructure, the regulator may 
restrict the number of licenses. According to Article 47 of the Telecommunica-
tions Law, the NCCIR may take a decision on restricting the quantity of li-
censes for certain kinds of business activity in the area of telecommunications 
services provision in order to ensure the efficient use of telecom networks and 
scarce resources in the interest of consumers. Although in these circumstances 
licensing is used to control market entry, the Article provisions are constructed 
to introduce competition. Thereby, if a decision on restricting the quantity of 
licenses is made, the licenses shall be granted on a competitive basis in an 
open, non-discriminatory and transparent procedure and under equal condi-
tions and requirements for all participants, which means individual require-
ments cannot be included to the license terms. 
In case of taking a decision on restricting the number of licenses, licensing 
requirements and specific procedure are determined by the NCCIR in accord-
ance with Article 47 of the Telecommunications Law. The NCCIR is obliged 
to announce a tender 60 days in advance by a publication in the NCCIR offi-
cial bulletin.  
In accordance with Article 48 of the Telecommunications Law, the validity 
term of telecommunications licenses is determined by the NCCIR individually, 
but may not be less than 5 years. The license term may be extended upon the 
licensee’s application (Article 49 of the Telecommunications Law). A license 
contains information on a specific area of telecommunications services provi-
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sion. Information about the issuance of the license and special conditions set 
out in the license shall be published in the NCCIR official bulletin. 
The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine determines a fee for the issuance of li-
censes, reissuance thereof, issuance of duplicates, copies and extension of the 
period of validity. The amount of a fee varies strongly depending on a tele-
communication service from UAH 340 for provision of fixed-line telephone 
services in rural areas to UAH 8 933 000 for provision of international fixed-
line telephone services (Article 53 of the Telecommunications Law). As a re-
sult, even when the number of licenses to provide services in a particular mar-
ket is not formally limited, it is apparent that high license fees can effectively 
limit the number of entrants to a lucrative market that is being reserved for the 
incumbent. 
4.3.2 Scarce telecommunications resources 
Both radio frequency and numbering resource are recognised by the Telecom-
munications Law as scarce resources (Article 70 of the Telecommunications 
Law). In order to ensure that they are utilized efficiently and managed in the best 
interests of society the Telecommunications Law establishes principles of their 
allocation: openness, non-discrimination, impartiality, competitiveness and 
equality of rights of access to the scarce resources for all telecommunications 
operators, usage of the numbering resource on a permissive and paid basis en-
suring the rational use of the numbering resource (Article 69 of the Telecommu-
nications Law in conjunction with Article 30 of the Radio Frequency Law).  
Radio frequency spectrum allocation is carried out according to the Plan for 
the Use of Radio Frequency Resource in Ukraine (Radio Frequency Plan)69 
(Article 23 of the Radio Frequency Law). The Radio Frequency Plan is de-
signed to ensure a forward-looking implementation of radio technologies and 
efficient use of radio frequency resource in Ukraine. It provides an exhaustive 
list of permitted radio technologies with the definition of radio frequencies and 
radio communication services, and termination terms of use.  
The radio frequency spectrum may be allocated on a competitive basis 
through tender or auction procedure or on a non-competitive basis. In case the 
demand for the radio spectrum exceeds its availability, the license is granted 
on a competitive basis according to procedures and conditions established by 
the NCCIR. The announcement of a tender and the results of such tender shall 
                                                 
69  План використання радіочастотного ресурсу України. Approved by the Decree 
of the Ministry of Transportation and Communication of Ukraine. Kyiv, 23 Novem-
ber 2006, N 1105. 
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be published in the NCCIR official bulletin. The tender procedure shall comply 
with the following conditions (Article 30 of the Radio Frequency Law):  
1) The tender notification shall be announced no later than 60 calendar days 
prior to the intended day of the tender by a publication in the Official Jour-
nal of the NCCIR and on its web site.  
2) Business entities are obliged to notify the NCCR about their intention to 
join the tender and submit the required documents no later than 30 calendar 
days prior to the tender. 
3) Te NCCIR decision on the tender award shall be published within five 
business days of the date of tendering in the Official Journal of the NCCIR 
and on its web site.  
Pursuant to the Radio Frequency Law (Articles 29, 31), the following activities 
are subject to individual authorization, and the legislation provides no exemp-
tions under which such requirement can be waived: 
 use of radio frequencies for telecommunication activities (license for use 
of radio frequencies) and 
 use of radio, electronic and /or transmitting devices. 
The license is granted by the NCCIR to the telecom operator that provides tel-
ecommunications services for the period established by the NCCIR, but not 
less than for five years. The license on radio frequency use shall contain in-
formation on allocated channels of radio frequencies, service, terms of its rec-
lamation (development), a geographic area where radio spectrum will be used, 
configuration and conditions for that use that could include payment of a fee, 
power limitations and requirements for compliance with specific requirements 
for such things as electromagnetic compatibility and non-interfering operation 
at relevant radio spectrum (Article 31 of the Radio Frequency Law). Fees for 
the issuance of a license for the use of radio frequency resource of Ukraine for 
a period of five years depend on the geographical location of the area where 
services shall be provided, the frequency range and vary from a minimum fee 
of UAH 170 to a maximum fee of UAH 1 360 000 (in Kiev) per 1 MHz.70 
The license is granted to a particular legal entity and cannot be transferred. 
However, the radio frequency used by telecom operators under the respective 
license may be relocated upon the joint application of telecom operators to in-
crease the efficiency of the use. Yet, the license is not transferred in such a 
case and will be received in the usual procedure. 
                                                 
70  Постанова Кабінету Міністрів Украіни “Про розміри плати за видачу, 
продовження строку дії, переоформлення, видачу дублікатів ліцензій на 
користування радіочастотним ресурсом України”. Kyev, 22 February 2006, N 200. 
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If the licensing activity requires the use of the numbering resource, a tele-
com operator must obtain the permit for allocation of the numbering resource 
from the NCCIR (Article 70 of the Telecommunications Law). For allocation 
of the numbering resource, the telecom operator shall file a respective applica-
tion to the NCCIR with necessary supporting documents (letter of substantia-
tion, business plan, etc.). Such application is considered by the NCCIR within 
one month, and a permit is issued within three days upon payment of the allo-
cation fee. The permit specifies the validity period of the respective telecom-
munications license without the right to assign it to third parties, except for 
secondary allocation to end-users. If the numbering resource is generated for 
the purpose of providing services, which are not subject to licensing, the per-
mit is granted for 5 years. The numbering resource shall be put into operation 
within a period of time specified in the permit in order to ensure its efficient 
use; otherwise the permit can be withdrawn by the NCCIR. 
Moreover, the permit and the allocated numbering resource can be with-
drawn on the basis of the NCCIR decision in the case of a misuse of the num-
bering resource or its illegal transfer to third parties, in case of an annulment or 
expiry of the license that was a ground for allocation of the numbering re-
source, and if the telecom operator applies for this (Article 70 of the Telecom-
munications Law).  
Provisions on state regulation of numbering resource of the telecommunica-
tions network use of Ukraine, the availability of numbering resources, effi-
ciency of the use of previously allocated numbering resources by the applicant, 
the amount of work already performed, specific perspectives for development 
of the applicant's infrastructure are taken into consideration by the NCCIR 
while making a Decision on allocation or refusal to allocate the numbering re-
source of Ukraine. In case an absence of available numbering resources on a 
specific territory, the NCCIR establishes a reserve capacity of numbers and, 
empowered by its separate decision, suspends the examination of applications 
on an allocation of numbering resource in the area. 
4.3.3 Interconnection 
The regulatory authority is obliged to ensure smooth interconnection between 
operators, including national roaming and possibility of migration of phone num-
bers between operators, their cooperation for interconnection purposes, based on 
an individual agreement between two market players. It also resolves disputes 
with regard to the interconnection between telecommunications networks. 
According to the Article 1 of the Telecommunications Law, interconnection 
is a type of access right involving physical means of connecting two different 
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networks for exchange of traffic, enabling users of one network to communi-
cate with users of the other. The legal framework for interconnection contains 
regulated rights of operators to access each others’ networks and services at a 
wholesale level, but not the rights of end users to access telecommunications 
services at a retail level. 
Article 57 of the Telecommunications Law lays down principles of inter-
connection between networks and contains relevant requirements to operators. 
Technical, organizational, commercial conditions and tariffs of interconnection 
to the operators that hold the monopolistic (dominant) position in the tele-
communications market shall be regulated by the NCCIR. Telecommunica-
tions operators are obliged to comply with technical requirements and the traf-
fic routing procedure stipulated for telecommunications networks. The deci-
sion of the NCCIR on the issues that arise between operators when entering 
into a contract on interconnection is binding and can be revoked only upon a 
court decision.  
Article 60 of the Telecommunications Law and the Rules on interconnec-
tion of telecommunications networks contain main requirements of mainly 
procedural nature to agreements on network-to-network interconnection.71 All 
telecom operators and telecom providers shall notify the NCCIR when they 
enter into interconnection agreements, amend or terminate them. However, 
there is no obligation to disclose executed contracts (Article 60 of the Tele-
communications Law). 
In accordance with Article 58 of the Telecommunications Law, telecom op-
erators have to ensure compliance with technical requirements stipulated for 
telecommunications networks, to provide other telecommunications operators 
willing to enter into interconnection contracts with all information necessary 
for this, as well as to offer interconnection conditions equal to those offered to 
other telecommunication operators. Telecom operators shall avoid creating ob-
stacles for interconnection between telecommunications networks; they shall 
take measures to ensure stable and quality interconnection between telecom-
munications networks during 24 hours, inform each other about damage to a 
telecommunications network or other events that lead or may lead to deteriora-
tion of service. They shall also share accounting data of telecommunications 
services provided via interconnection points of their networks, make settle-
ment of payments under the provisions of the contract in full amount and in a 
timely manner, comply with the traffic routing procedure stipulated by regula-
tory acts. Interconnection between telecommunications networks has to be 
provided at all technically feasible locations with the capacity required for 
                                                 
71  Правила взаємоз'єднання телекомунікаційних мереж загального користування. 
Approved by the Decision of the NCCIR. Kyiv, 8 December 2005, N 155. 
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quality provision of telecommunications services. When providing intercon-
nection, operators are prohibited to require from each other performance of any 
kinds of works, services, incur costs aimed at installing additional equipment 
for their telecommunications networks. 
The Telecommunications Law foresees special obligations for the telecom 
operators with significant market power. Such operator has no right to reject 
requests for interconnection with its telecommunications network unless a 
network to be interconnected with does not meet the requirements set out in 
the Telecommunications Law (Article 60 of the Telecommunications Law). 
Pursuant to Article 59 of the Telecommunications Law, telecom operators 
holding a monopolistic (dominant) position are required to submit to the 
NCCIR offers of interconnection. Any such offer shall contain information 
about the telecommunication network, all available access points, technical, 
organizational and other terms of interconnection. Telecom operators not hold-
ing a dominant position may disclose such offers at their own discretion. The 
NCCIR publishes such offers of interconnection in its annual Catalogue of 
Proposals on Interconnection of Telecommunications Networks. The NCCIR 
publishes information on interconnection agreements concluded by telecom 
operators on a quarterly basis (Art 59 of the Telecommunications Law). 
4.3.4 Protection of public interest and consumer rights 
Article 62 of the Telecommunications Law introduces the notion of publicly 
available telecommunications services that means a minimum set of services of 
standardised quality defined by this Law that is accessible to all consumers in 
the entire territory of Ukraine. Ukraine aims for ubiquitous coverage of its ter-
ritory with publicly available services as the Concept of Telecommunications 
Development of Ukraine suggests.72 The Concept foresees a procedure and 
terms of providing access to publicly available services for consumers in rural, 
mountainous areas, as well as vulnerable consumer groups such as families 
with low income, pensioners and disabled people and foresees deadlines for 
providing the possibility of general access to publicly available services to the 
whole population of Ukraine, construction volumes of telecommunications 
networks and necessary capital investments for achieving this objective.  
The publicly available telecommunications services include a connection to 
telecommunications networks of public use at a fixed location (also called uni-
versal access), the possibility to call emergency services and enquiry services 
                                                 
72  Концепція розвитку телекомунікацій в Україні. Approved by the Decree of the 
Cabinet of the Ministers of Ukraine, 7 June 2006, N 316-p. 
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and to use a pay phone. Article 63 of the Telecommunication Law further ren-
ders the criteria of the universal access provision more precise. It shall be pro-
vided at a consumer request to connect his or her terminal equipment to public 
telecommunications networks at regulated tariffs. The respective public tele-
communications networks shall be able to provide voice-based telephony (both 
making and receiving of local, national, international calls), facsimile commu-
nications, data transfer on the level sufficient for consumers to access Internet. 
Additionally, the cost of the described connection shall not depend on access 
technology and the way of connecting.  
Telecommunications operators and providers are obliged to employ special 
tariffs for publicly available telecommunications services to disabled and so-
cially vulnerable persons – to be financed from a compensation mechanism to 
be set up by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Emergency services (calling 
the fire brigade, police, ambulance, gas emergency service) shall be provided 
free of charge (Article 39 of the Telecommunications Law). 
According to universal access provisions, when consumer demand for pub-
licly available telecommunications services is insufficiently satisfied in certain 
regions of Ukraine, the NCCIR can take a decision to impose an obligation to 
develop and provide publicly available telecommunications services to con-
sumers on the telecommunications operators with dominant position in that 
market rendering services on the entire territory of Ukraine as well as fixed-
line communication operators exercising or intending to exercise business ac-
tivity in provision of services in these regions. For the loss occurred while ful-
filling these obligations, compensation may be requested through the men-
tioned compensation mechanism. 
5. Perspectives of regulatory approximation and the stake in 
the EU internal market 
The examination of the Ukrainian legislation and regulation governing tele-
communications sector against the backdrop of its international obligations 
demonstrates that Ukraine has utilized the accession guideline and the negotia-
tion procedure to the WTO in order to substantially revise its legal basis, to 
liberalise an access to its domestic services market and to lower regulatory bar-
riers. At the moment, the majority of Ukrainian’s commitments under the 
GATS are on the way to be realised as the legal foundation for it is in place. 
A full-fledged legal and institutional reform73 has been taking place since 
                                                 
73  For instance, since the ratification of the Ukraine’s WTO Accession Protocol in 
2008, important amendments to the telecommunications legal framework were in-
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Ukraine joined the WTO, and it has been intensified by the singing of the As-
sociation Agreement with the EU and the change of the political course of 
Ukraine. One of the recent significant developments in this regard was the in-
troduction of competition on the market for fixed telephony and the privatiza-
tion of Ukrtelecom74, the largest state-owned operator of fixed lines and 3G 
mobile network. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian telecommunications market is 
still far from being effectively competitive and requires intensive intervention 
by the regulator. This can be explained by the fact that Ukrtelecom as an in-
cumbent enjoys a substantial market power in the telecommunications segment 
mostly due to the possession of the largest wired (copper) telephone network 
rolled out in the Soviet times. Competition between Ukrtelecom and local 
fixed-line telecom operators is very weak. On the other hand, competition law 
needs to be reformed, and its enforcement requires adjustment to the new eco-
nomic reality.  
A pivotal role in the transition from monopoly to competition obliges a 
strong pro-competitive regulatory authority. The NCCIR does possess the nec-
essary competences to effectively regulate the telecommunications market, and 
it is being very active and rather transparent since its creation in November 
2011. However, the efficiency and effectiveness of its activities cannot be ade-
quately assessed due to the political turmoil of the recent years and the result-
ing from it changes in personnel and legal and regulatory framework. The ten-
der to award licenses for 3G communication in an IMT-2000 (UMTS) standard 
is likely to be the first serious test for the NCCIR75 as it might result in break-
ing the quasi-monopoly of Ukrtelecom owns through its subsidiary LLC 
“TriMob”76 the only 3G license issued so far. This licence was obtained in 
2005 on a non-competitive basis. 
Although Ukraine has arguably started a comprehensive reform to modern-
ise its legislation and transform its telecommunications market, the complex 
requirements under the Association Agreement, especially those with regard to 
regulatory approximation, are not likely to be reached in the near future. To 
start with, the independence and competences of the regulator NCCIR need to 
be further enhanced, especially in the sphere of regulation of operators and 
providers with significant market power. The list of possible remedies in the 
                                                                                                                                                     
troduced by 39 laws adapted by the Parliament of Ukraine. 
74  In 2011 the Austrian investment firm EPIC bought 92.79 percent of the State stock for 
10.5 billion hryvnas, which was an equivalent of around 972 million Euro at that time. 
75  The tender is announced for the 16th of February 2015 as a voice trading. See 
<http://www.nkrzi.gov.ua/index.php?r=site/index&pg=99&id=718&language=uk>.  
76  The company and license details are available on its official website: 
<http://3mob.ua/about>. 
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context of market regulation needs to be updated and the measures themselves 
to become more nuanced. Principles of competition shall be deeper integrated 
in the sector specific regulation, for instance, in the part of price regulation; 
this requires, of course, the enhancement of the role of competition law and its 
modernisation. 
Implementation of precisely defined EU law provisions will take a lot of 
time and conceptual adjustment. The level of development of Ukrainian infra-
structure lags behind EU Member States so that not all regulatory solutions 
required by the EU can be implemented in Ukraine and some intermediary 
steps will be necessary. The above-mentioned tender for 3G licence is a perfect 
demonstration of this thesis: it occurs when in the EU most countries are auc-
tioning off 4G/LTE licences, and the universal coverage with basic broadband 
of 1 mbps was reached in September 2013.77 In addition, the current political 
situation complicates the proper legislative developments and their further im-
plementation. 
At the same time, the Association Agreement foresees a tough implementa-
tion deadline: for all of the above-mentioned items in the telecommunications 
area it is four years upon the entering into force of the Association Agreement, 
except for the Competition Directive which is to be implemented within two 
years. This may seem short. However, the process of regulatory approximation 
is to start on the date of signing of the Association Agreement. Between sign-
ing and entering into force many years will pass giving Ukraine a great amount 
of time to lay foundations for this undertaking, namely to familiarise itself with 
the full substantive content of the requirements, to determine the scope of nec-
essary legal, institutional and administrative reforms, to conduct an impact as-
sessment, to assess the required budgetary needs, to start institutional reforms 
and amendments of related legal and regulatory frameworks and so on.  
However, the procedural provisions concerning regulatory approximation 
and the possibility for Ukraine to take part in the internal market reveal some 
shortcomings such that it might be difficult to assess progress of Ukrainian re-
forms and to define the moment when closer market integration could happen. 
Approximation and implementation of laws are controlled under separate 
procedures (Appendix XVII-6, Sections 3 and 4 respectively). First, the appro-
priateness of implementation is evaluated (approximation) with the help of 
special cross-comparison tables (transposition tables). Then, continuity of ap-
plication and adequacy of enforcement of the national laws is assessed that 
have been classified as properly implemented by a competent European Com-
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release_IP-13-968_en.htm>. 
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mission service. This is done on the basis of “adequate evidence” that includes 
sufficient administrative capacity, satisfactory track record of sector-specific 
surveillance and investigation, prosecutions and administrative and judicial 
treatment of violations. 
The stake in the EU internal market will be granted sector by sector, follow-
ing Ukraine’s progress in approximation of sectoral regulation. When Ukraine 
considers that regulatory approximation in a given sector has been achieved, it 
informs the EU, and the EU in cooperation with Ukraine undertakes a compre-
hensive assessment of the approximation and enforcement of sectoral rules 
(Article 4 para. 2 Annex XVII AA). The EU then reports to the Trade Commit-
tee whether all conditions are indeed satisfactorily fulfilled. If the report is pos-
itive, the Trade Committee may decide that the Parties shall grant each other 
internal market treatment with respect to the sector at issue (Article 4 para. 3 
Annex XVII AA).  
What exactly is internal market treatment and how does it differ from na-
tional treatment? According to Article 88 AA, national treatment means treat-
ment no less favourable than accorded to own legal persons, branches and rep-
resentations. Internal market treatment means that there are no restrictions on 
freedom of establishment and services provision for legal persons of the other 
Party and that they shall be treated in the same way as own legal persons (Arti-
cle 4 para. 3 Annex XVII AA). The Association Agreement suggests that there 
is a difference between treating “no less favourably”78 and treating “in the 
same way”, although it is not entirely clear. The latter treatment is a more ad-
vanced form of commitment, even though the wording implies that internal 
market treatment could be less advantageous than national treatment.  
A definite part of the internal market treatment is granting freedom of es-
tablishment and freedom of services provision, although it can be argued that 
they are already part of national treatment,79 what makes the distinction be-
tween the two more obscure. According to the Association Agreement, the in-
dicated freedoms apply only to legal persons, and it is not completely clear 
what implications it will have for posted workers. Free movement of workers 
and self-employed is clearly excluded and can further remain subject to do-
mestic restrictions (Article 4 para. 6 Annex XVII AA). Obviously, in these ar-
eas additional negotiations and separate agreements are necessary. Moreover, 
                                                 
78  On the meaning of „no less favourable“ under the GATS see the WTO Panel Report 
and Appellate Body Report on the case EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/R and WT/DS27/AB/R, respectively, of 
09.09.1997. 
79  Mattoo, Aaditya, National Treatment in the GATS: Corner-Stone or Pandora’s Box?, 
in: Journal of World Trade 31:1, 1997, esp. at pp. 114-117. 
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while speaking in terms of fundamental economic freedoms makes perfect 
sense when characterising the market opening in the EU, it is less sensible for 
Ukraine for which national treatment is the limit. By comparison to the EU that 
has a possibility to grant a Ukrainian subsidiary, established in one of its 
Member States, secondary freedom of establishment for the whole Union,80 
Ukraine cannot do this. Therefore, a logical way to interpret Article 4 para. 3 
Annex XVII AA is that freedom of establishment and freedom of services pro-
vision starts to apply in full between the EU and Ukraine, but only in relation 
to legal persons and only to the sector where regulatory approximation is ac-
complished. It needs to be seen, however, whether this value-added to national 
treatment is a sufficient incentive for Ukraine to undertake a radical reform. 
Granting the internal market treatment on the sector-by-sector basis is an 
unorthodox approach. During the accession process, the EU opened up its 
market on the territorial basis (country by country, in some cases) and/or on 
the basis of individual fundamental freedoms. Opening market access sector by 
sector corresponds to the logic of the GATS negotiations and commitments 
and highlights the balancing act that the Association Agreement is trying to 
manage, namely to incorporate the sector-based approach to trade liberalisation 
at the international level and the EU approach based on fundamental freedoms.  
The benefits of the market opening on the sector-by-sector basis are not 
immediately clear. To begin with, due to the above-discussed possibility of 
extension of the transposition lists by the Trade Committee (see Article 3 para. 
3 Annex XVII AA) it may not be easy for Ukraine to establish the point in 
time when conditions for completing the enactment and implementation of the 
(parts of) acquis are fulfilled to its satisfaction. The possibility to constantly 
add new transposition tasks will have the effect of keeping Ukraine running 
after a carrot with very low chances of getting it. Also, it makes a joint assess-
ment of this completion by the EU and Ukraine a complicated task providing 
an additional reason to disagree and to postpone the granting of the internal 
market treatment.  
Furthermore, regulatory approximation in the services sectors, which are 
the scope of application of Annex XVII AA, and approximation of laws pro-
vided for in other provisions of a horizontal character (for instance, in the field 
of competition, Article 256 AA, and public procurement, Article 148 AA) are 
not clearly interlinked. The same is the case for other obligations (for example, 
on intellectual property rights, on state aid) that has a clear objective to align 
                                                 
80  Currently, the EU’s schedule of specific commitments to the GATS explicitly ex-
empts application of fundamental freedoms of establishment and services provision 
to subsidiaries from third-countries where national treatment has been granted by in-
dividual Member States. 
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Ukrainian practice to the EU standards and rules and can be considered laws 
approximation in disguise. The question arises whether a sector can be granted 
the internal market treatment before approximation of these general issues is 
completed. The Association Agreement does not provide for an assessment 
mechanism of this type of legal and regulatory approximation and there are no 
rules on how it is taken into account for individual sectors evaluation. All in 
all, it remains unclear whether full harmonisation is necessary for Ukraine’s 
participation in the internal market. 
Additionally, sector-by-sector approach leaves the question open at what 
moment the EU market in services is completely open or whether it will ever 
happen. Differently from Section 1 Chapter 6 “Establishment, Trade in Services 
and Electronic Commerce”, which apply to all services (Article 86 para. 13, Ar-
ticle 87, Article 92 AA), Annex XVII AA applies only to four services sectors: 
financial services, telecommunications services, postal and courier services and 
international maritime transport services. Besides, as described above, the inter-
nal market treatment will apply only to two fundamental freedoms and not in 
full: freedom of establishment and freedom of services provision – both for legal 
persons. Is there a possibility to expand the internal market treatment beyond 
this, namely to natural persons and/or to other services sectors? 
To end on the positive note, sector-by-sector market opening has its ad-
vantages. First, it allows Ukraine to set priorities and to exploit its comparative 
advantages while fulfilling its obligations of approximation. For instance, 
Ukraine may start with sectors that require less legislative efforts, that are al-
ready sufficiently open due to reforms in connection with its accession to the 
WTO and that are economically more competitive and/or more important. Sec-
ond, by working intensely on individual sectors to obtain internal market 
treatment, Ukraine will steer investments. Once again, this is a call for strategic 
economic planning for Ukrainian policy-makers. Third, the piecemeal tactics 
suits well the EU’s purposes. Because the accession offer is not on the table, it 
would have been a difficult task to keep Ukraine waiting until all preconditions 
are fulfilled in order to grant fundamental freedom in all services sectors. This 
may take years or even decades and obstruct Ukrainian reforms. By contrast, 
opening the internal market to individual sectors whose regulation has been 
successfully harmonised and enforced sends an immediate positive signal. It 
may also stimulate interested actors (lobbyists, consumers) in different sectors 
of economy who, in their turn, would exercise pressure on the government to 
actuate reforms. It may also lead to a competition between individual govern-
mental authorities to complete the reforms in their respective sectors. 
 
47 
Recent ZERP Discussion Papers  
(hard copy and online at www.zerp.eu) 
DP 1/14 Christian Joerges / Tobias Pinkel / Ulf Uetzmann (Hrsg.), Josef Falke 
zum 65. Geburtstag, May 2014 
DP 1/13 Christian Joerges / Peer Zumbansen (Hrsg.), Politische Rechtstheorie 
Revisited. Rudolf Wiethölter zum 100. Semester, March 2013 
DP 1/11 Christian Joerges / Tobias Pinkel (Hrsg.), Europäisches Verfassungs-
denken ohne Privatrecht – Europäisches Privatrecht ohne Demokratie?, 
May 2011  
DP 3/10 Michelle Everson / Frank Rodriguez, What Can the Law do for the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks? Good Governance and Comitology 
'within' the System, December 2010 
DP 2/10 Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Europäische Rechtspolitik als transnationale 
Verfassungspolitik. Soziale Demokratie in der transnationalen Konstella-
tion, February 2010 
DP 1/10 Andreas Fischer-Lescano / Christian Joerges / Arndt Wonka (Hrsg.), The 
German Constitutional Court’s Lisbon Ruling: Legal and Political-
Science Perspectives, January 2010  
DP 3/09 Andreas Fischer-Lescano/Lena Kreck, Piraterie und Menschenrechte. 
Rechtsfragen der Bekämpfung der Piraterie im Rahmen der europäischen 
Operation Atalanta, June 2009  
DP 2/09  Poul F. Kjaer, Three-dimensional Conflict of Laws in Europe, March 
2009  
DP 1/09 Florian Rödl, Europäische Arbeitsverfassung, February 2009 
DP 8/08 Sjef van Erp, Security interests: A secure start for the development of Eu-
ropean property law, November 2008  
DP 7/08 Sergio Nasarre Aznar, Eurohypothec & Eurotrust. Two instruments for a 
true European mortgage market after the EC White Paper 2007 on the In-
tegration of EU Mortgage Credit Markets, September 2008  
DP 6/08 Tobias Pinkel, Das Buch VI des Entwurfs eines Gemeinsamen Referenz-
rahmens (DCFR): Nichtvertragliche Schuldverhältnisse aus Schädigung 
Dritter. Eine kritische Analyse des Modellgesetzes eines europäischen 
Deliktsrechts, August 2008  
DP 5/08 Julia Cassebohm, Beitritt der Europäischen Union zur Europäischen 
Menschenrechtskonvention – Voraussetzungen, Wege und Folgen, July 
2008  
DP 4/08 Claudio Franzius, Der Vertrag von Lissabon am Verfassungstag: Erweite-
rung oder Ersatz der Grundrechte?, July 2008  
48 
Recent ZERP Working Papers  
(online at www.zerp.eu) 
WP 3/2014 Yuriy Fesh de Jour, Das vielfältige Gesicht der organisierten Krimi-
nalität: Ihre Organisationsformen und Strukturen am Beispiel chinesi-
scher, japanischer und italienischer krimineller Organisationen, Oc-
tober 2014 
WP 2/2014 Ulf Uetzmann, Einige Bemerkungen zum neuen Schema allgemeiner 
Zollpräferenzen der Europäischen Union, June 2014 
WP 1/2014 Christian Joerges / Jürgen Neyer, Deliberativer Supranationalismus 
in der Krise, January 2014 
WP 2/2013 Batura, Olga, Liberalisierung der Telekommunikationsdienstleistun-
gen, December 2013 
WP 1/2013 Christoph U. Schmid / Jason Dinse, Towards a Common Core of Res-
idential Tenancy Law in Europe? The Impact of the European Court 
of Human Rights on Tenancy Law, July 2013 
WP 2/2012 Christoph U. Schmid, The Dutch and German Notarial Systems Com-
pared, December 2012 
WP 1/2012 Silvia Sonelli, Constitutional Rights without a Constitution: The Human 
Rights Act under Review, January 2012 
WP 4/2011 Andreas Fischer-Lescano / Steffen Kommer, Der Luftangriff bei 
Kunduz. Völker- und verfassungsrechtliche Fragen, December 2011 
WP 3/2011 Katharina Ewert, Die Überprüfung von Schiedssprüchen auf ihre 
Vereinbarkeit mit europäischem Kartellrecht im Anschluss an die Eco 
Swiss-Entscheidung des EuGH, September 2011 
WP 2/2011 Andreas Fischer-Lescano / Carsten Gericke, The ICJ and Transnational 
Law. The “Case Concerning Jurisdictional Immunities” as an Indicator 
for the Future of the Transnational Legal Order, September 2011 
WP 1/2011 Klaus Sieveking, Ende einer Dienstfahrt: Erinnerungen an eine Bre-
mer akademische Professionalisierung, May 2010 
WP 4/2010 Thurid Ilka Gertich, Menschenrechte in Chile am Beispiel des Zu-
gangs zu AIDS-Medikamenten, April 2010 
WP 3/2010 Christian Joerges / Christoph Schmid, Towards Proceduralisation of 
Private Law in the European Multi-Level System, January 2010 
 49
WP 2/2010 Andreas Fischer-Lescano / Carsten Gericke, Der IGH und das trans-
nationale Recht. Das Verfahren BRD ./. Italien als Wegweiser der zu-
künftigen Völkerrechtsordnung, January 2010 
WP 1/2010 Johanna Wallenhorst / Marie Vaudlet, Rechtsfolgen des Einsatzes 
privater Sicherheits- und Militärfirmen, January 2010 
WP 10/2009 Klaus Sieveking, Introduction of political participation rights  
for non-EU-national immigrants in Germany, November 2009 
WP 9/2009 Christoph U. Schmid, The ‚Three Lives’ of European Private Law, 
Oktober 2009 
WP 8/2009 Franz Christian Ebert, Between Political Goodwill and WTO-Law: 
Human Rights Conditionality in the Community’s New Scheme of 
Generalised Tariff Preferences (GSP), September 2009 
 
